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The Caseload Conundrum, Constitutional Restraint and the
Manipulation of Jurisdiction
Nancy Levit*
The quantity of litigation in the federal courts has reached unprecedented heights. This "crisis of volume"' has attracted the attention of
legislators, scholars and, most particularly, judges. Numerous proposals
to relieve the overburdened courts, through increasing resources or altering institutional structures, remain in the realm of theory. 2 Thejudiciary has been left to divine self-help measures to reduce litigants' use of
the federal courts. The federal bench that must manage this caseload
explosion includes a cadre of recently appointed federal judges.3 Many
of these judges embrace the New Federalism, an initiative
to shift gov4
ernmental power and responsibility back to the states.
This Article posits that the combination ofjudicial overload and injudicious federalism is operating to shunt certain classes of litigants away
from federal courts. The Supreme Court as well as numerous district
and appellate courts are creating new procedural and substantive theo* Assistant Professor, University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law;J.D., University of Kansas, 1984; B.A., Bates College, 1980. This article is dedicated to the Honorable Frank G. Theis, of
the United States District Court for the District of Kansas, who still believes that federal courts
should be open and just. I am grateful to Jack Balkin, Dennis Corgill, Martin Levit, Doug Linder,
Joan Mahoney, Ibrahim Wani and Ray Warner, all of whom were generous with helpful comments
on at least one incarnation of this article.
1 Hellman, CourtingDisaster, 30 STAN. L. REv. 297, 297 (1986). The premise that the litigation
explosion is evil often goes unchallenged. Increased litigation may result from an expansion of
individual rights and remedies, a generally positive development, rather than from the failure of
other social institutions. Stempel, A Distorted Mirror: The Supreme Court's Shimmering View of Summay
Judgment, Directed Verdict, and The Adjudication Process, 49 OHIo ST. LJ.95, 96 n.4 (1988).
2 See, e.g., Ginsburg & Huber, The Intercircuit Committee, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1417 (1987); Baker &
McFarland, The .Veedfor a New National Court, 100 HARV. L.REV. 1400 (1987); Thompson, Increasing
Uniformity and Capacity in the Federal Appellate System, 11 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 457 (1984); Note, Of
High Designs: A Compendium of Proposalsto Reduce the Workload of the Supreme Court, 97 HARV. L. REV. 307
(1983).
3 President Reagan has appointed a startling number of these judges on the federal bench. By
November of 1988, he had installed 79 judges on appellate courts and 272 judges on district
courts-more than 48 percent of all federal judges. Cohodas, Reagan's Legacy Is Not Only On the Bench,
46 CONG. Q. 3392 (Nov. 26, 1988). These judges, who are "predominantly white, male and
wealthy," are promoting a conservative agenda. Coyle, TheJudiciay: A Great Right Hope, 10 NAT'L
L.J., April 18, 1988, at 22.
More significant are his appointments to the Supreme Court. In January of 1987, President
Reagan appointed justice Antonin Scalia to the Supreme Court, and elevated Justice William Rehnquist to the position of ChiefJustice. In November of 1987, the High Court seat vacated by Justice
Powell was filled by President Reagan's appointment ofJustice Anthony Kennedy. These appointments solidify a conservative bloc comprised of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy,
O'Connor, Scalia and White. Comment, The Pendulum Swings: The Rehnquist Court and the De-Emphasis
of Individual Liberty in Criminal Procedure Analysis, 65 U. DET. L. REV. 291, 291-93 (1988). See also
Estreicher, Conserving the FederalJudiciaryfora ConservativeAgenda, 84 MICH. L. REV. 569 (1986); Comment,Justice Scalia andJudicialRestraint: A Conservative Resolution of Conflict Between Individualand State,
62 TUL. L. REV. 225 (1987); Gotschall, Reagan 's Appointments to the US. Courts of Appeals: The Continuation ofaJudicialRevolution, 70 JUDICATURE 48 (June-July 1986).
4 Shenefield, The Parker v. Brown State Action Doctrine and the New Federalism of Antitrst, 51 ArITRUST LJ.337, 337 (1982).
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ries to restrict federal jurisdiction. Federal courts are increasingly using
the doctrines of preclusion, preemption, abstention and remand to shuttle cases or decision-making authority back to state courts. Complementing this procedural routing of cases is an expansion of summary
procedures and a dramatic reduction in the scope of substantive constitutional rights.
Federal docket-clearing practices are eliminating the possibility of
substantive relief and the protection of a federal forum for a spectrum of
politically underrepresented and powerless classes. Equally important,
this manipulation of jurisdiction is unprincipled and inconsistent. While
conservative 5 judges urge judicial restraint, they often practice selective
activism. At times caseload concerns seem paramount to federal courts,
while at other times courts ignore the access-expansive effects of their
decisions. Indeed, the malleability of the overload issue suggests it is
being used as an instrument to further other goals. The selective use of
caseload as a justification for restricting Article III jurisdiction leads to a
decrease in the uniformity and predictability of decisions, and it blurs the
boundaries of already ill-defined theories of federal jurisdiction.
This Article questions the propriety of thejudiciary's use of administrability concerns in the formulation of jurisdictional theories. While
court efficiency appears to be a deserving goal, the current method of its
implementation is through a reduction of court access to particular
classes of litigants. The Article analyzes the concept of administrability
and posits that administrative efficiency is actually a value-laden argument for selecting which litigants should be permitted access to federal
courts.
This Article also critically examines whether the adjustment ofjurisdictional theories by the judiciary is either an effective docket-clearing
mechanism or a desirable institutional practice. Analysis of the political
and ideological assumptions underlying jurisdictional manipulation and
the implications of judicial molding of Article III jurisdiction raises serious separation of powers and fairness concerns regarding the quest for
administrative efficiency.
Finally, the Article offers a new, access-expansive approach to jurisdiction. The proposed ratchet theory ofjurisdiction creates a guiding
principle of jurisdictional analysis. If, as a number of Supreme Court
justices and commentators have suggested, the Constitution operates
substantively like a one-way wrench-rights may be expanded by constitutional interpretation, but not contracted-a jurisdictional analog is imperative. Federal courts should adopt jurisdictional rules that offer the
greatest chance of merits determinations.
5 While there is no adequate definitional capsule of "liberal" or "conservative," I use "liberalism" as shorthand for the political views that government regulation and social welfare programs
are good and necessary, that autonomy is valuable, and that courts must be open to protect constitutional rights from majoritarian power. See West, Liberalism Rediscovered: A Pragmatic Definition of the
Liberal Vision, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 673 (1985). I use "conservatism" as descriptive of the political
tendency to favor local or state government control and community values, a commitment to the free
market, a distaste for social welfare programs, and a desire to reduce access to courts for certain
types of suits. See generally I. KRISTOL, ON THE DEMOCRATIC IDEA IN AMERICA (1972).

THE CASELOAD CONUNDRUM

1989]

I.

The Burgeoning Federal Docket

Between 1960 and 1983, district court filings rose 250% while cases
docketed in the courts of appeals surged 686%.6 A long line of surveys
provide supporting evidence of the upward caseload trend in federal
courts. 7 The increasing complexity of cases brought in federal courts
amplifies the burden generated by caseload growth.8 Additional factors
straining the institutional capacity of the federal courts include the increasing sophistication of procedural maneuvering, 9 and the development of satellite litigation concerning such issues as Rule 11 sanctions' 0
and attorneys' fees."
The litigation explosion complainants have their detractors. Social
scientists have questioned the empirical basis for the claim of unprecedented caseload growth.' 2 Selective recapitulations of huge cases, atroc6 R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 61-67 (1985). During the same span,
the volume of filings in the Supreme Court increased by about 115%. Id. at 74. Judge Posner
further endorses his premise that the federal courts are overworked by examining other indicators
such as the swell in the number of published opinions, the greater number of concurring and dissenting opinions and the increase in the amount of trials completed. Id. at 66-73. See also Marvell,
Are Caseloads Really Increasing?, 25 JUDGES J. 34 (Summer 1986) (since 1950 civil caseloads have
doubled every 15 to 20 years); Wermeil, Appeals Court Judges in Unique Session, Fret About Quality of
Decision-Making, Wall St.J., Nov. 1, 1988, at B10, col. 4 ("By the year 2000, the number of cases filed
each year in the [federal] appeals courts will rise to 75,000 from the current level of 37,524," according to Judge Donald Lay of the Eighth Circuit, while "the number of appeals court judges will increase to 289 from the 168 currently authorized by Congress.").
7 See, e.g., Clark, Adjudication to Administration:A Statistical Analysis of Federal District Courts in the
Twentieth Century, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 65 (1981); Heydebrand and Seron, The Rising Demandfor Court
Services: A StructuralExplanation of the Caseload of the U.S. District Courts, 11 JUST. Sys. J. 303 (1986).
8 See Clark, supra note 7, at 125-48.
9 Courts often remark on the procedural machinations of the litigants before them. See, e.g.,
Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 421 (1979) (appellees failed to appeal a temporary restraining order,
but instead "initiated two months of procedural maneuvering in both the state and federal courts");
Century Products, Inc. v. Sutter, 837 F.2d 247, 248 (6th Cir. 1988) ("[ilt is pointless to proceed with
time consuming procedural maneuvering in this court"); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler ChryslerPlymouth, Inc., 814 F.2d 844, 847 (1st Cir. 1987) (the district court proceedings were slowed repeatedly by defendant's "imaginative delaying tactics").
10 The amendment of FED. R. Cxv. P. 11 was intended in part to stem the tide of the surge in
litigation. See George v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 116 F.R.D. 628, 630 (N.D. Ind. 1987) ("mounting
federal caseloads and growing public dissatisfaction with the costs and delays of litigation have made
it imperative that the federal courts impose sanctions on persons and firms that abuse their right of
access to these courts"). See also Note, Plausible Pleadings: Developing Standardsfor Rule 11 Sanctions,
100 HARV. L. REV. 630, 631 (1987). However, it has had the opposite effect by spawning side litigation on the issue of sanctions. See, e.g., Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d
1531, 1542 (9th Cir. 1986) (reversing district court's imposition of sanctions and commenting that
Rule 11 should be interpreted in a manner that will not encourage litigation); Fred A. Smith Lumber
Co. v. Edidin, 845 F.2d 750, 752 (7th Cir. 1988) (reversing and remanding district court's imposition
of sanctions for more specific factual findings "[t]o avoid prolonging and complicating Rule 11 satellite litigation").
11 See, e.g., United Nuclear Corp. v. Cannon, 564 F. Supp. 581, 592 (D.R.I. 1983) ("[flee applications under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and kindred statutes have become a burgeoning form of satellite
litigation in the federal courts").
12 This critique ofjudicial gridlock appears to have been pioneered by Marc Galanter. Galanter,
Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What e Know and Don't Know (And Think We Know) About Our Allegedly
Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4 (1983). His theme has been replayed, with slight
variations, by a number of other researchers. See, e.g., Schulhofer, The Futureof the Adversary System, 3
JUST. Q. 83 (1986); Sarat, The Litigation Explosion, Access to Justice and Court Reform: Examining the Critical
Assumptions, 37 RUTrERS L. REV. 319 (1985).
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ity stories concerning petty filings 13 and war stories have been criticized
as failing to offer proof of overall trends. 14 Judges have been lambasted
for "crying wolf." 15
Skeptics are met with an almost vitriolic response from certain
judges. The evidence of disbelievers is attacked as "very spotty" and the
suggestion is made that they "might be indulging in the joys of contradicting received wisdom."' 16 Judge Harry Edwards documents a substantial increase in the workload per judge and concludes that
"perceptions of a system in crisis are neither wholly accurate nor wholly
baseless."17
No comprehensive study exists which considers all of the necessary
variables to adequately measure and evaluate the workload of the federal
courts. However, even if the critics are accurate, and judges' complaints
concerning the size of their dockets are overstated, judicial perception in
this instance strongly influences practice. Judges are not only the ones
feeling overburdened, they are also the ones deciding cases. Those in
charge of the bench possess powerful tools to express their displeasure
when they think they are overworked.
The alteration of theories of recovery, standing, procedure and restraint as a means to handle case overload is openly acknowledged and
even advocated by a number of judges. One of the most direct in his
confrontation of the problem and most specific in his proposed solutions
is Judge Richard Posner of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit. In The Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform, Posner proposes
a direct reallocation of federal court cases to state courts.' 8 Indeed, his
thesis is that neither structural and internal reforms nor resource expansion will solve the caseload volume crisis. Instead, Posner advises rethinking both jurisdictional and substantive doctrines to reduce the
number of cases in the federal system. Posner's approach is to reduce
the scope of federal jurisdiction by paring down the statutory and constitutional rights that currently occupy the federal bench. 19 Judge Posner
13 See, e.g., In re Green, 669 F.2d 779, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (prescribing procedure for handling
suits filed by a pro se prisoner who filed over 600 complaints). This petitioner was described by
Judge Edwards as "the most prolific prisoner litigant in recorded history." Edwards, The Rising Mork
Load and Perceived "Bureaucracy" of the Federal Courts: A Causation-BasedApproach to the SearchforAppropriate Remedies, 68 IOWA L. REV. 871, 902 (1983).

14 Neubauer, Are Me ApproachingJudicialGridlock? A CriticalReview of the Literature, 11 JUsT. SYs. J.
363, 364 (1986).
15 Clark,JudgePosner's Theology and the Temples of the Law, (Book Review), 1985 Wis. L. REV. 1183,
1185 n.13 (reviewing R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM (1985)). ("Crying wolf

has a long and honorable history. The ChiefJustice normally considers it his institutional responsibility to complain about excessive work or insufficient personnel.").
16

R. POSNER, supra note 6, at 76.

17 Edwards, supra note 13, at 895.
18 R. POSNER, supra note 6. Although Posner recognizes that federal judges should enforce
rights likely to be disfavored in state courts, R. POSNER, supra note 6, at 182, 186, he suggests shipping to state courts two-thirds of all diversity cases, half of the civil rights, admiralty and Jones Act
cases, and 10% of state prisoner cases. Id. at 189 n.31.
19 Posner advances a grab bag of substantive proposals. He suggests relegating "social questions," such as "[c]apital punishment, control of pornography, education of aliens, [and] regulation
of conception" to the states. Id. at 197. He would permit federal courts to strike down state laws
under the fourteenth amendment only if the laws countenance a life, liberty, or property deprivation
"inviolation of a fundamental social norm held by most of the nation." Id. at 194 (emphasis in original).
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should be commended on two counts. First, when he adjusts jurisdictional theories to take case overload into consideration, he does so explicitly. Second, in both his judicial opinions and law review writings, he
attempts to make a principled distinction with respect to when overload
is a permissible consideration.
Judge Posner's theories have already crept into his judicial opinions. 2 0 In Smith v. DeRobertis,2 1 his majority opinion held that the simultaneous trial of two criminal defendants in the same courtroom before two
different juries does not violate due process. The opinion appears to
make the due process rights of a criminal defendant turn on the caseprocessing interests of the federal system. 2 2 Posner reasoned that "judi23
cial economy is not a trivial goal in this era of massive case loads."
24
In Phelps v. Duckworth, Judge Posner lamented that federal habeas
corpus review for state petitioners has become "a web of technicalities."
Posner's devotion to judicial economy is so extreme that he characterized
a coerced confession as a "somewhat insecure foundation" for nullifying
a state conviction in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. 25 Posner's attempt to elevate judicial economy from the level of a "trivial goal"
threatens to turn justice into one.
While Judge Posner's particular solutions may be somewhat idiosyncratic, the results he reaches in individual cases are genuinely mainstream. Otherjudges also express the view that certain types of cases are
unjustifiably occupying too much of the federal courts' time.2 6 In Vicoty

v. Walton,2 7 the Sixth Circuit required the civil rights plaintiff, a state prisoner, to prove that state remedies were inadequate to handle his claim of
property deprivation. However, the threshold showing of inadequacy required by the Vicory court-a "systematic problem with the state's corrective process" 2 8-was far greater than any inadequacy-of-state-remedy
He urges that "if a court cannot honestly determine whether [a constitutional] right exists then it

should be denied; doubts should be resolved against the claimant." Id. at 273.
20 In addition to those cases discussed in the text, see Minority Police Officers Ass'n v. City of
South Bend, 721 F.2d 197, 200 (7th Cir. 1983), in which Judge Posner addresses the issue of when
claims are separate for purposes of Rule 54(b) certification for appeal. In developing a presumption
against characterizing a pleading as containing multiple claims for relief-to reduce the number of
claims certified for immediate appeal-Judge Posner focused on the "grave practical objections to
reading the rule broadly. The caseload of the federal courts of appeals has increased faster than that

of any other component of the federal judiciary, and is now eight times as great as it was in 1960,
while the number of court of appeals judges has less than doubled." Id.
21

758 F.2d 1151, 1152 (7th Cir. 1985).

22 Id.
23 Id.
24 772 F.2d 1410, 1419 (7th Cir.) (Posner, J., concurring), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 1011 (1985).
25 Id. at 1418.
26 The Honorable Francis L. Van Dusen called for either a congressional solution to manage the
caseload of the federal courts or the exercise ofjudicial restraint to make the federal fora less available by creating limitations on justiciable issues. Van Dusen, Comments on the Volume of Litigation in the
FederalCourts, 8 DEL.J. CORP. L. 435, 436, 448 (1983). See also Smith, The Role of the FederalCourts, 88
CASE & COM. 10, 14 (1983) (Judge Henry Friendly of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit remarks that courts must "avert the flood by lessening the flow"); Hearings on the State
of the Judiciay And Access to justice, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-10, 272-92 (1977) (views of ChiefJustice
Warren Burger advocating the abolition of general diversity jurisdiction).
27 721 F.2d 1062, 1064-65 (6th Cir. 1983).
28 Smith v. Rose, 760 F.2d 102, 108 (6th Cir 1985).
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burden previously imposed by Supreme Court rulings. 2 9 The expressed
basis for the Vicory requirement was that "[s]ection 1983 damage suits
take up a large part of the time of the federal courts." 30 The Vicory court
was clearly less concerned with remedying due process violations than
with remedying the crowded federal courtscape burdened with inmate
3
section 1983 suits. '
Similarly, in Thurman v. Rose, 3 2 the court determined that a section
1983 inmate-petitioner who complained of a government property deprivation failed to state a claim. Holding that the availability of a state law
post-deprivation remedy defeated the existence of a section 1983 cause
of action, the court emphasized that "there can be no reason to have a
parallel tort law developing in the already overburdened federal
33
courts."1
Many judges candidly recognize the role case overload plays in their
decisions. 3 4 Many more do not.3 5 As the remainder of this Article discusses, these caseload concerns underlie theoretical shifts in a variety of
procedural and substantive areas.
Case overload or the perception of overload has led an array of federal judges to tinker with both procedural and substantive theories in an
effort to whittle down the volume of cases in their courts. The scope of
federal jurisdiction for certain types of cases is shrinking. The purpose
behind some of these transformations in theory is often not openly
29 Id. ("a deprivation of due process is no less a constitutional violation for being aberrant rather
than systematic").
30 I'icory v. Malton, 721 F.2d at 1065 n.4.
31 Smith v. Rose, 760 F.2d at 108. See also Emory v. Duckworth, 555 F. Supp. 985, 991 (N.D. Ind.
1983) (denying inmate's motion for appointment of counsel in a § 1983 conditions case and then
granting the prison superintendent's motion for summary judgment based on the inmate's lack of
effective pro se response to the motion, meanwhile noting that the number of § 1983 pro se prisoner
cases "has mushroomed tremendously in the past few years").
32 575 F. Supp. 1488, 1491 (N.D. Ind. 1983).
33 Id.
34 In Dunton v. County of Suffolk, 748 F.2d 69, 70 (2d Cir. 1984), the court justified its consideration of a motion for a writ of prohibition as a motion for reconsideration or rehearing as a "creative
solution ... that will help to reduce unnecessarily swollen appellate dockets." In Breest v. Moran,
571 F. Supp. 343 (D.R.I. 1983), the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island
denied a prisoner's habeas petition which challenged his transfer from a New Hampshire to a Rhode
Island prison. The court indicated its distinct displeasure at being troubled by the substance of the
complaint:
Having been fairly tried and convicted of a heinous crime, and having received a sentence
commensurate with his malefaction, he has whiled away the time by concocting a parade of
horribles, dressing his creations in the garb of successive applications for post-conviction
relief, and loosing them upon a variety of courts. The cumulative effect of this tomfoolery
has been to clog further already-overburdened federal and state courts and profligately to
waste both judicial resources and tax dollars.
id. at 346.
35 See, e.g., Duva v. Bridgeport Textron, 632 F. Supp. 880, 884 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (holding that the
plaintiff's Title VII claims are outside the subject matter jurisdiction of the court, ostensibly because
the scope of the plaintiff's EEOC charge had not given the individual defendant supervisors sufficient notice that they would be named as defendants in a lawsuit; but in actuality the court emphasized the institutional interest in stringent enforcement of procedural rules to reduce the federal
court caseload, and then dismissed the pendent state claims against the individual defendants).
Commentators have already expressed the view that overly busy courts are far more likely to
render flawed and sloppy decisions. Dressier, A Lesson In Incaution, Overwork, and Fatigue: TheJudicial
,1liscraflsmanshipof Segura v. United States, 26 WM. & MARY L. REv. 375, 391, 415 n.204 (1985).
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stated, but the patterns become evident when viewed in historical
perspective.
II.
A.

Limiting the Scope of Federal Jurisdiction
The Recent Endorsement of Summary Adjudication

In 1986, the Supreme Court decided three cases which delineate a
substantially new attitude toward summary judgment. 3 6 As recently as
1979, the Court had noted that summary judgment was highly inappropriate to determine fact-intensive issues such as state of mind requirements. In Hutchinson v. Proxmire,3 7 the Court stated that proof of actual
malice in a public figure defamation suit "does not readily lend itself to
summary disposition." The Supreme Court's 1986 trilogy signaled dramatic changes in application of the rule.
In Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,38 the Supreme Court held that a
district court considering a summary judgment motion in a public figure
libel action must consider whether the plaintiff can show actual malice by
clear and convincing evidence. By requiring the trial judge to "bear in
mind the actual quantum and quality of proof necessary to support liability" under the applicable substantive law, 39 Anderson makes summary
judgment easier for defendants to obtain since it imports higher trial
burdens of proof that the nonmovant must shoulder into the dispositive
motion stage. In a striking departure from the logic of Hutchinson,40 Anderson reflects a willingness to view summary judgment favorably, even
when the primary issue is state of mind. Moreover, Anderson is an invitation to litigants and trial courts to engage in "a full blown paper trial on
the merits." 4 ' In dissent, Justice Brennan concluded that the Anderson
procedure would undermine litigants' constitutional right to a jury
trial.4 2 Moreover, Anderson is not a first amendment decision, but a clear
token of the Supreme Court's new attitude toward summary judgment.
Justice Brennan noted that the majority did not limit its holding to the
context of libel and thus "change[d] summary judgment procedure for
36 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
37 443 U.S. 111, 120 n.9 (1979).
38 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
39 Id. at 254.
40 In a footnote, the Court attempts to distinguish Hutchinson by stating that its comment in that
case concerning the difficulty of resolving the actual malice inquiry at the summary judgment level
was "simply an acknowledgment of our general reluctance 'to grant special procedural protections
to defendants in libel and defamation actions in addition to the constitutional protections embodied
in the substantive laws.' " Id. at 256 n.7 (quoting Calder v.Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790-91 (1984)).
41 Id. at 261 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The appellate decision in Anderson, by now Supreme
Court Justice Antonin Scalia, stated that the imposition of an "increased proof requirement at this
stage would change the threshold summary judgment inquiry from a search for a minimum of facts
supporting the plaintiff's case to an evaluation of the weight of those facts and (it would seem) of the
weight of at least the defendant's uncontroverted facts as well." Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson,
746 F.2d 1563, 1570 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
42 477 U.S. at 267.
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regardless of the substantive nature of the underlying
all litigants,
43
litigation."
In Celotex Corp. v Catrett,44 the Court examined another facet of the

Rule 56 procedure and used broad language in support of granting summary judgment. The Court stated that Rule 56 does not require "that
the moving party support its motion with affidavits or other similar
materials negating the opponent's claim."-4 5 The movant may discharge
its burden simply by showing "that there is an absence of evidence to
support the nonmoving party's case. ' 46 In addition to analyzing the
summary judgment burdens in a manner favoring the movant, the Celotex
Court employed sweeping language favoring the motion: "[S]ummary
judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural
shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole,
which are designed 'to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.' ,47
The final summary judgment decision in the trilogy, Matsushita Electric IndustrialCo. v. Zenith Radio Corp. ,'48 emphasized the liberality of summary judgment standards and infused summary judgment analysis with
the requirement that the plaintiff's claim make "economic sense."'4 9 The
district court had granted summary judgment to more than twenty defendants in this complex antitrust case, finding that an inference of attempted monopolization was unreasonable. The Third Circuit reversed
and held that sufficient circumstantial evidence of concerted action
tended to show that an injury had occurred. 50 The Supreme Court reversed, remanded and ordered that summary judgment be reinstated.
Focusing on what constitutes a "genuine" issue of fact, the Supreme
Court stated: "When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule
56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." 51 Matsushita thus permits
factually weak claims to be weeded out by encouraging the district court
43 Id. at 257 n. I (Brennan, J., dissenting). Indeed, lower courts have applied the Anderson standards "in a wide range of cases not involving first amendment issues." See Comment,JusticeDelayed is
Justice Denied: SummaiyJudgment Following Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 30 ARIZ. L. REV. 171, 180
(1988).
44 477 U.S. 317 (1986). Celotex was a wrongful death action against an asbestos manufacturer.
Celotex moved for summary judgment, claiming that the plaintiff had failed to produce evidence that
any of its products caused the decedent's death. The plaintiff produced three documents which she
claimed raised genuine factual issues concerning her husband's exposure to defendant's asbestos
products. Celotex argued that the documents were inadmissible hearsay. The district court granted
defendant's summary judgment motion, holding that plaintiff failed to prove her decedent had been
exposed to Celotex's products. The D.C. Circuit reversed because it ruled that defendant's motion
for summary judgment had not adduced any affidavits or other evidence to disprove plaintiff's theories. The Supreme Court reversed.
45 Id. at 323 (emphasis in original).
46 Id. at 325.
47 Id. at 327 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 1). This is the first time a Supreme Court majority opinion
has brought Rule I of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the "fast, fair and friendly" rule, into
play in support of the issuance of summary judgment.
48 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
49 Id. at 587.
50 In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d. 238, 304-05 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd sub
nona. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
51 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. at 586 (footnote omitted).
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to engage in both a quantitative and qualitative determination of the evidence. 52 Perhaps more significant than Matsushita's emphasis on the
availability and utility of the summary judgment procedure was the
Supreme Court's focus on economic rationality. 53 The Court held: "It
follows from these settled principles that if the factual context renders
[plaintiffs'] claim implausible-if the claim is one that simply makes no
economic sense-[plaintiffs] must come forward with more persuasive
'54
evidence to support their claim than would otherwise be necessary."
The result and reasoning in Matsushita virtually command the trial judge
to invade the jury's province to ascertain the "economic sense" of each
plaintiff's claim.
A combined reading of Matsushita, Anderson, and Celotex clearly establishes the Supreme Court's new attitude toward summary judgment procedure. 55 Contrary to past doctrines of restraint, 5 6 the High Court is
cultivating an aggressive approach to the use of summary judgment to
encourage more rapid pretrial disposition of cases. The very mission of
57
the summary judgment procedure is to eliminate the need for a trial.
The reinvigorated standards applicable to the processing of summary
judgment motions invite broad judicial delving into and weighing of evidence. This beckons ad hoc decisions and injects a dangerous amount of
unpredictability into the summary judgment procedure. 5 8
The new summary judgment burdens favor civil defendants, since
plaintiffs must clear a higher hurdle to overcome a summary judgment
motion. Summary judgment procedure already possessed a pro-defendant slant; the new standards simply add to the imbalance.5 9 A process
that expedites the administration of justice at the possible expense of
fairness to plaintiffs is far too costly. Finally, the Matsushita touchstone of
economic rationality introduces a utilitarian calculus, and a concomitant
political tilt,60 to pre-trial procedural analysis. For federal courts anxious
52 Childress, A Vew Erafor Summary Judgments: Recent Shifts at the Supreme Court, 116 F.R.D. 183,
186 (1987).
53 While the Supreme Court recognized that "the defendant's refusal to deal might well have
sufficed to create a triable issue," it held that due to economic factors, the defendant lacked a motive
to join the alleged conspiracy. Mlatsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. at 587. In
Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962), an antitrust case, the Supreme
Court held that summaryjudgment should be used sparingly when motive is an element of the claim.
The Matsushita Court failed to refer to Poller.
54 .11atsushitaElec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. at 587.
55 See Jacobs, Supreme Court's 1986 Summary Judgment Trilogy: A ProposedAnalytical Model, 54 DEF.
CouNs.J. 502, 507 (1987).
56 See, e.g., Addickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 160 (1970).
57 FED. R. Civ. P. 56 advisory committee's note on 1963 amendment.
58 See Stempel, supra note 1, at 108 (trial judges will become involved "in more activities that
look suspiciously like pretrial factfinding").
59 Defendants, who use the motion far more than plaintiffs, "are disproportionately comprised
of society's 'haves': banks, insurance companies, railroads, business organizations, governments and
government agencies, [while] [pilaintiffs are disproportionately comprised of society's 'have nots':
individuals, business sole proprietorships, and smaller entities." Stempel, supra note 1, at 161 (footnotes omitted).
60 A full blown examination or critique of the "law and economics" approach is beyond the
scope of this article. See, e.g., Wright, TheJudicialRight and the Rhetoric of Restraint: A Defense ofJudicial
Activism in an Age of ConservativeJudges, 14 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 487 (1987):
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to clear their dockets, the
new criteria will produce a greater number of
61
dismissals before trial.
B.

Streamlining: The Elimination of "Overlapping" Remedies

Federal courts are also striving to find ways to package disputes
more efficiently. One method of streamlining cases is to limit the remedies applicable to a given set of circumstances. The notion of preemption-that one avenue of relief is unavailable when an alternative remedy
exists-is creeping into a variety of public interest fields. This section
will touch upon several of the most recent examples of preemption from
the Supreme Court and several courts of appeals.
62
In Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Ass 'n.
6
3
and Smith v. Robinson, the Supreme Court determined that a cause of
action under section 1983 may be precluded by a comprehensive statutory scheme. A number of lower federal courts picked up this theme of
section 1983 preemption and have applied it to bar actions under not
only section 1983, but also other civil rights statutes, when an alternate
Act of
cause of action is available under Title VII of the Civil Rights
65
196464 or under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.
While the courts employing preemption reason that Title VII was
intended to be the exclusive avenue of relief for those circumstances to
which it applies, these courts give very little thought to anything other
than facial overlap of the statutes, which are all viewed as dealing with
Streamlining concerns
generally. 6 6
employment discrimination
The inappropriateness of pricing constitutional rights is not the only systematic difficulty
economic analysis encounters in legal decisions....
This marketplace assumption of basic equality can work to limit the claims for relief of
inequality the courts will find acceptable . . . . When the courts accept this model, they
implicitly accept the "marketplace" assumption that actors are more or less equal. Having
made that assumption, the courts are less likely to act to remedy obvious inequalities in the
relative ability of speakers to have their say, as the cases demonstrate. The marketplace
model conflicts directly with such claims because it tends to deny the very inequality at
issue.
Id. at 514-15 (emphasis in original).
As this Article discusses below, see text accompanying note 325, what is important about economic analysis and jurisdictional theories is that many courts are engaging in surreptitious costbenefit analysis: weighing the importance of court overload, without counterpoising the gravity of
rights deprivations.
61 Stempel, supra note 1, at 168.
62 453 U.S. 1 (1981) (holding that a § 1983 claim was not available because the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act contained comprehensive enforcement mechanisms).
63 468 U.S. 992 (1984) (denying plaintiff's claim for attorney's fees, which would otherwise be
available under § 1983, because plaintiff had asserted a claim under the Education of the Handicapped Act).
64 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-l-2000ek-17 (1986). See, e.g., Foster v. Wyrick, 823 F.2d 218, 222 (8th
Cir. 1987) ("a Title VII disparate impact claim may not be asserted in a § 1983 action"); Bowman v.
Bank of Del., 666 F. Supp. 63 (D. Del. 1987) (ifTitle VII is available, the substantive right violated by
a private conspiracy must be derived from somewhere other then § 1985(3)); Tafoya v. Adams, 612
F. Supp. 1097 (D. Colo. 1985) (precluding concurrent claims for discrimination under § 1981 and
Title VIII), aff'd, 816 F.2d 555 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 152 (1987).
65 42 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1986). See, e.g., Ring v. Crisp County Hosp. Auth., 652 F. Supp. 477
(M.D. Ga. 1987) (ADEA completely preempts claims under § 1983, whether those claims are
founded on the Constitution or on rights created by the ADEA).
66 See generally Levit, Preemption of Section 1983 By Title 1I: An UnwarrantedDeprivation of Remedies,
15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 265, 294-95 (1987) (significant administrative and procedural differences exist
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predominate. The efficacy of the remedial mechanisms in the statutes
that are argued to preempt section 1983 is unquestioned. 67 How effectively the alternative remedies redress violations of fundamental constitutional rights is ignored.
While these section 1983 preemption cases have been simmering in
the lower courts, the Supreme Court recently decided a preemption case
with far-reaching potential for eliminating an entire species of constitutional litigation. In Schweiker v. Chilicky,6 8 the Court addressed the issue
of what amounts to statutory preclusion of a constitutional cause of
action.
Since the 1971 decision in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,6 9 the Supreme Court has developed and expanded
a doctrine to protect individuals against the violation of constitutional
rights by federal officials. In Bivens the Court held that individuals could
sue for damages directly under the Constitution for the impairment of
federal rights. 70 A Bivens action is unavailable when Congress has provided an alternative, equally effective remedy that it explicitly declares to
be a substitute for a straight constitutional action. 71 Independently, a
a Bivens suit when there are "special factors
court may refuse to permit
'7 2
counselling hesitation."
Schweiker creates a rule-swallowing interpretation of the "special factors" exception. The petitioners in Schweiker were Social Security Act
claimants whose benefits were improperly terminated. They filed a Bivens action in federal court alleging that federal officials had adopted illegal policies leading to the termination of their benefits in violation of the
due process clause. The Supreme Court addressed whether a Bivens
remedy should be implied for alleged due process violations in the denial
of disability benefits.
The Court ruled that the "special factors" exception precluded the
suit. 73 In a remarkable departure from past rulings, 74 the Schweiker Court
held that because Congress in the Social Security Act failed to provide a
between Title VII and § 1983; Title VII contains severe limitations on possible relief; positing that
statutes should be preemptive of § 1983 only if complete relief is available to plaintiffs under the
alternate statute).
67 In a decision going somewhat against recent trends, Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment & Housing Auth., 479.U.S. 418 (1987), the Supreme Court ruled that tenants living in lowincome housing projects could sue under § 1983 for violation of the Housing Act of 1937. While the
opinion rested primarily on the absence of any congressional intent in the Housing Act to preclude a
§ 1983 claim, the majority did state that the remedial mechanisms in the Housing Act were not
"sufficiently comprehensive and effective to raise a clear inference that Congress intended to foreclose a § 1983 cause of action for the enforcement of tenants' rights secured by federal law." Id. at
425. The Court's reasoning in l'ight offered some hope of a sensitive inquiry into the efficacy of
statutory alternatives. Those hopes were dashed by the Supreme Court's opinion this term in
Schweiker v. Chilicky, 108 S. Ct. 2460 (1988), discussed more fully infra text accompanying notes 6880, which clearly establishes the malleability of interpreting "Congressional intent."
68 108 S. Ct. 2460 (1988).
69 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
70 Id. at 397.
71 Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18-19 (1980).
72 Id. at 18 (quoting Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396; Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 245 (1979)).
73 Schweiker v. Chilichy, 108 S. Ct. at 2468-71.
74 The mere fact, that Congress was aware of the prior injustices and failed to provide a
form of redress for them, standing alone, is simply not a 'special factor counselling hesita-
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money damages remedy against officials whose unconstitutional conduct
75
led to the wrongful denial of benefits, the Court would not imply one.
Essentially, Schweiker imputes to Congress the desire to leave constitutional rights without effective protection. 7 6 Elsewhere in the majority
opinion, the Court acknowledged that a sine qua non of a Bivens action was
the lack of an alternative remedy. 7 7 Thus, under the original formulation, a Bivens action is unavailable when there is an alternative, exclusive
remedy, and under the Schweiker definition of the "special factors" exception, Bivens is also unavailable when there is not an alternative statutory
remedy.
Schweiker is transparent in its recognition that a converse decision
might result in a deluge of new Bivens actions in federal courts. 7 8 The
majority observes that "[m]illions of claims are filed every year under the
Act's disability benefits programs alone . . . . -79 Concerned that the allowance of a damages remedy will open the courthouse doors to
thousands of suits, the Court instead permits the unwarranted denial of
benefits to the helpless to go unremedied.8 0 To deny a remedy for egregious violations of federal rights out of fear that large numbers of suits
might be brought in federal courts to vindicate those rights is constitutional chutzpah.
A variety of other statutory preemption issues are percolating in the
lower federal courts. 8 1 Among the difficulties engendered by many of
tion' in the judicial recognition of a remedy. Inaction, we have repeatedly stated, is a notoriously poor indication of congressional intent ....
Schweiker v. Chilicky, 108 S. Ct. at 2476 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Bob Jones Univ. v. United
States, 461 U.S. 574, 600 (1983); Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 185 n.21 (1969)).
75 Schweiker v. Chilicky, 108 S. Ct. at 2468-71.
76 See Note, Bivens Doctrine in Flux: Statutory Preclusionof a ConstitutionalCause ofAction, 101 HARV.
L. REV. 1251, 1268 (1988) (arguing that no presumption of preemption should arise absent an explicit declaration of congressional intent).
77 Schweiker v. Chilicky, 108 S. Ct. at 2467.
78 Indeed, the petitioners argued that the sheer size of the disability benefits program was itself a
"special factor" counseling against the existence of a Bivens remedy. Id. at 2480 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
79 Id. at 2468.
80 Cf. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 248 (1979) (holding that a direct cause of action under
the Constitution may be implied for fifth amendment violations, and rejecting the argument that a
deluge of federal court suits should be an institutional factor counseling limited recognition of constitutional claims). There may be a question whether the plaintiffs in Schweiker actually were deprived
of procedural due process, since presumably they had a post-deprivation hearing. See Matthews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). However, the plaintiffs should have been permitted to overcome the
Bivens "Justiciability" hurdle in any event.
81 For example, administrative action by the United States Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) can preclude a citizen suit under the Clean Air Act or the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act, if the EPA has commenced and is diligently prosecuting a civil action in a "court." See 42 U.S.C.
§ 7604 (b)(1)(B) (1982); 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (b)(1)(B) (1982). In Baughman v. Bradford Coal Co.,
Inc., 592 F.2d 215, 218 (3d Cir. 1979), the court held that an administrative hearing board can be a
"court" if it has the power to grant relief to enforce an implementation plan. The Baughman court
justified the reach of its approach by stating that "Congress intended to provide for citizen's suits in
a manner that would be least likely to clog already burdened federal courts and most likely to trigger
governmental action which would alleviate any need for judicial relief." Id. But see Friends of the
Earth v. Conrail, 768 F.2d 57, 62 (2d Cir. 1985) (declining to follow the Baughman approach and
ruling that "court" means court). See generally Comment, Administrative Preclusionof Environmental Citizen Suits, 1987 U. ILL. L. REv. 163.
For a discussion of older decisions limiting the availability of implied rights of action, see Stewart & Sunstein, Public Programsand Private Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1193, 1302-07 (1982). A more
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these preemption cases are the separation of powers problems in courts'
assessment of legislative intent, and whether the efficiency motivations
underlying preemption decisions justify the elimination of alternative avenues of relief. Most disturbing, though, is the judicial paring down of a
wide range of public interest remedies without satisfactory analysis concerning how effectively the remaining remedies redress violations of statutory and constitutional rights.
C.

Increasing The Preclusive Effect of State and Administrative Proceedings

Rules of preclusion conserve court resources by decreasing opportunities for repeated litigation of a single claim and opportunities for successive litigation of related claims. A persistent trend in the federal
courts is toward expanding the preclusive effect of state court and admin82
istrative agency adjudications. In Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp.
the Supreme Court held in a Title VII suit that the full faith and credit
clause requires federal courts to give preclusive effect to final state court
judgments after state court review of state administrative agency
83
decisions.
Four years later, in University of Tennessee v. Elliott,8 4 the Supreme
Court extended the principles of preclusion to encompass administrative
as well as court proceedings. The Court held that unreviewed state administrative determinations were entitled to preclusive effect in federal
court in the absence of Congressional intent "to create an exception to
general rules of preclusion." 8 5 Importantly, in Elliott the Court's decision did not rest on 28 U.S.C. § 1738, which requires federal courts to
give full faith and credit to judgments of state courts. State administrathe Court
tive determinations were given preclusive effect 8because
6
reached to federal common law rules of preclusion.
The Elliott Court specifically found a lack of Congressional intent for
unreviewed state administrative proceedings to have a preclusive effect
on federal claims under Title VII.87 The Court came to the opposite
conclusion with respect to section 1983.88 For statutes other than Title
VII and section 1983, the breadth of the language used in Elliott stands as
an open invitation to invoke preclusion: "it is sound policy to apply prinrecent enunciation of the disfavored status of implied causes of action can be found injustice Scalia's
concurrence in Thompson v. Thompson, 108 S.Ct. 513, 522 (1988)(Scalia, J., concurring), in which
he submits that the Court should adopt "the categorical position that federal private rights of action
will not be implied."
82 456 U.S. 461 (1982). At about the same time, the Supreme Court also ruled that the full faith
and credit statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982), required federal courts to give both issue and claim
preclusive effect to state court judgments in § 1983 actions. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980)
(issue preclusion); Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75 (1984) (claim
preclusion).
83 456 U.S. at 481.
84 477 U.S. 788 (1986).
85 Id. at 797.
86 Id. at 794.
87 Id. at 796.
88 Id. at 796-97.
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ciples of issue preclusion to the fact-finding of administrative bodies act89
ing in a judicial capacity."
A number of lower federal courts have accepted the Elliott invitation
and applied preclusion rules in varied statutory contexts to a wide range
of administrative agency actions that the courts deem to be 'judicial" in
nature. In Mack v. South Bay Beer Distributors, Inc. ,90 the Ninth Circuit
presumes, without discussion, that Elliott requires preclusive effect to be
given to the administrative agency's decision in Age Discrimination in
Employment Act cases. Similarly, in Martin v. Malhoyt,91 Elliott preclusion rules were applied, again without analysis, to a direct Bivens action
and to plaintiff's section 1985 claims.
In addition to applying administrative preclusion to various causes
of action without a careful examination of the propriety of extending Elliott into uncharted areas, courts have expansively interpreted when an administrative agency is acting in a "judicial capacity." 9 2 Minnesota's
Office of Administrative Hearings was held to have operated in ajudicial
capacity in Deretich v. Office of Administrative Hearings93 primarily because
an independent hearing examiner "spent five days hearing the grievances and issued a fifty-six page advisory opinion." 9 4 The existence of an
independent hearing examiner was a necessary conclusion for the court
to reach, since the very administrative agency making the findings was
the defendant in the discrimination suit, 9 5 but certainly not a sufficient
basis to establish the judicial nature of the proceedings. As Elliott itself
recognized, for an administrative body to operate in a "judicial capacity,"
there must be more procedural protections than simply an unbiased
96
umpire.
Coupled with the vagaries of when an administrative agency is acting
in ajudicial capacity is the lack of any principled distinctions by the lower
courts concerning when a plaintiff has had a full and fair opportunity to
litigate his or her claims before the state agency. For example, in Yancy v.
McDevitt 9 7 the plaintiff contended he had no full and fair opportunity to
89 Id. at 797.
90 798 F.2d 1279, 1283 (9th Cir. 1986). The Mack court reversed and remanded because the
plaintiff did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate his age discrimination claims in an administrative proceeding concerning the denial of his benefits.
91 830 F.2d 237, 264 (D.C. Cir.), rehg denied, 833 F.2d 1049 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
92 Elliott had a hearing before an employee of the university. He had the right to counsel and to
notice of the charges against him. He was entitled to file written motions, briefs, and arguments, and
to request subpoenas. The administrative order included separate factual findings and conclusions
of law. An appeal was available within the University, with further review available in the Tennessee
courts. Elliott v. University of Tenn., 766 F.2d 982, 985 (6th Cir. 1985).
93 798 F.2d 1147 (8th Cir. 1986).
94 Id. at 1154. Cf. Buckhalter v. Pepsi-Cola Gen. Bottlers, Inc., 820 F.2d 892 (7th Cir. 1987), in
which an administrative law judge presided over a four day hearing, before which the parties engaged in extensive pre-trial discovery. Both sides were represented by counsel, who filed extensive
memoranda of law. The recorded proceedings totaled 680 pages and the ALJ's opinion "contained
thorough findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a cogent legal analysis applying the relevant facts
to the Illinois law of employment discrimination." Id. at 895.
95 See New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 612 F.2d 644, 649 (2d Cir. 1979)
("clearly, deferral to a state agency's fact finding is inappropriate once that agency is the defendant
in a discrimination suit").
96 See supra note 92.
97 802 F.2d 1025 (8th Cir. 1986).
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litigate his race discrimination claims before the school board that terminated him from his teaching position due to parental complaints about
his behavior in intimidating children. Yancy argued that he conducted
limited investigation prior to the school board hearing which did not disclose racial animus. 98 The Eighth Circuit reviewed the hearing transcript
and found that because Yancy introduced evidence of discrimination and
since his job was at risk, he had an incentive to litigate the issue of discrimination, which the court translated into a full and fair opportunity to
litigate. 9 9
Elliott's reach is disturbing. Lower federal courts are applying its
rules of preclusion to a host of statutes' 0 0 and administrative proceedings' 01 unmentioned, but perhaps not unintended, by the Elliott Court.
Equally troubling are Elliott's effects. Plaintiffs may not have the incentive, knowledge, or resources to adequately litigate claims at administrative stages. 10 2 The minimally adjudicatory administrative proceedings
that qualify as performing in a "judicial capacity" mean that plaintiffs
may also lack adequate procedural protections at the administrative
stage.' 0 3 Since preclusion proceeds on the assumption that the administrative body affords the equivalent of a federal judicial proceeding, courts
should evaluate not only the fact-finding actually accomplished by the
agency, but also the purpose of the agency forum, the relation of the
decisionmakers to the case, the administrative review available, and so
on. In short, courts should evaluate the full range of considerations in
determining whether the administrative forum is an adequate substitute
for access to the federal courts.
The ultimate effect of increasing the application of preclusion rules
is to restrict access of discrimination victims to federal forums.' 0 4 The
98 Id. at 1030.
99 Id. at 1031.
100 See, e.g., Stillians v. Iowa, 843 F.2d 276, 281-84 (8th Cir. 1988) (applying Elliott to conclude
preclusion warranted in an ADEA case); Mack v. South Bay Beer Distrib., Inc., 798 F.2d 1279 (9th
Cir. 1986) (holding that administrative preclusion may be appropriate in ADEA cases where there
has been adequate state court review). Contra Duggan v. Board of Educ., 818 F.2d 1291 (7th Cir.
1987) (concluding that preclusion principles should not apply in ADEA cases); Delgado v. LockheedGeorgia Co., 815 F.2d 641 (11th Cir.) (refusing to apply the Elliott rationale to suits under the
ADEA), reh "gdenied, 820 F.2d 1231 (11 th Cir. 1987).
101 Martin v. Malhoyt, 830 F.2d 237, 264 (D.C. Cir.) (applying preclusion principles to the determination of a Police Department Adverse Action panel), reh g denied, 833 F.2d 1049 (D.C. Cir. 1987);
Buckhalter v. Pepsi-Cola Gen. Bottlers, Inc., 820 F.2d 892, 895-97 (7th Cir. 1987) (employing Illinois Human Rights Commission findings to preclude a § 1981 action); Yancy v. McDevitt, 802 F.2d
1025, 1030-31 (8th Cir. 1986) (giving preclusive effect to a school board termination hearing) reh'g
denied, 820 F.2d 1231 (8th Cir. 1987).
102 See, e.g., Mack, 798 F.2d at 1284 ("an employee's incentive to litigate an unemployment benefits claim is generally much less than his incentive to litigate a discrimination claim where generally
the stakes are much higher").
103 Moreover, the broader systemic issues regarding the adequacy of administrative hearings go
unquestioned in many opinions. See, e.g., Barber v. American Security Bank, 655 F. Supp. 775, 778
(D.D.C. 1987)(holding that the Office of Appeals and Review acted in a judicial capacity because its
enabling statute authorized it to hold evidentiary hearings and because the plaintiff was represented
by counsel), appeal dismissed, 841 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Warner v. Graham, 675 F. Supp. 1171,
1176 (D.N.D. 1987) (holding, without substantive analysis, that the administrative agency afforded a
full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues), rev'd on other grounds, 845 F.2d 179 (8th Cir. 1988).
104 Comment, The Role of Preclusionin Title I': AnAnalysis of CongressionalIntent, 71 IowA L. REv.
1473, 1475 (1986).
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preclusion cases themselves are a testament that federal courts provide a
superior forum for the resolution of complicated constitutional matters. 10 5 It has also been persuasively argued that federal courts provide a
more hospitable tribunal for victims of discrimination than do state
courts or administrative bodies. 10 6 Indeed, deprivation of a federal forum may be tantamount to deprivation of rights because of the insensitivity and limited expertise of state bodies with respect to federal
constitutional issues. 10 7 While expansion of the preclusion rules to increase reliance on state agencies' fact-finding limits the work of the federal courts,10 8 it necessarily decreases the quality of decision-making to a
least common denominator standard.
D. Abstention: Deferring Cases
Even if a plaintiff has a claim that is properly cognizable in federal
court, the federal court may decline to hear the case under an abstention
doctrine. The theories of abstention are complex. 10 9 The broadest of
these abstention theories was created in Younger v. Harris.110 As originally formulated, Younger abstention required a federal court to abstain
from interfering with ongoing state criminal matters to promote the interests of equity, comity and federalism."'
105 See, e.g., Button v. Harden, 814 F.2d 382 (7th Cir. 1987) in which a state administrative body's
factual and legal conclusions were given collateral estoppel effect, even though the Seventh Circuit
acknowledged that they were arguably inadequate:
The causal issue-whether Button's misconduct was so serious that the district would have
been moved to fire him even if he had never complained to the police about his supervisors'
misconduct-is tricky and the hearing officer may have misunderstood it and failed to make
necessary findings; but in that case Button's recourse, if he wanted to pursue the matter in
the Illinois courts, was to ask the circuit court to remand the case to the hearing officer for
additional findings.
Id. at 385.
106 Neubome, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1115-30 (1977).
107 See, e.g., Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 500, 502-11 (1982); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S.
22, 23 (1980).
108 Federal courts often have to engage in complicated preclusion analysis, and then, if the state
agency's actions are not preclusive, federal courts must find facts anew.
109 Four primary types of abstention exist: Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (abstention to
avoid interference with ongoing state criminal proceedings); Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312
U.S. 496 (1941) (abstention to avoid resolution of unclear issues of state law which will obviate the
need to reach federal constitutional issues); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (abstention to
avoid interference with a state's regulatory scheme), reh'g denied, 320 U.S. 214 (1943); Colorado
River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, reh'gdenied, 426 U.S. 912 (1976); and
Moses H. Cone Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983) (abstention in favor of parallel
state litigation under exceptional circumstances: where comprehensive disposition of the litigation
is available, state law provides the substantive rule, and the state forum is adequate).
110 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Under the other abstention theories, federal courts may refuse to entertain jurisdiction only in limited circumstances. Under Younger, federal courts may exercise jurisdiction only in limited circumstances. Zeigler, Rights Require Remedies: A .\ew Approach to the Enforcement of
Rights in the Federal Courts, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 665, 691 (1987).
111 401 U.S. at 43-44. The only exceptions to Younger abstention applied when the state action
challenged by the federal plaintiffwas flagrantly unconstitutional or instituted in bad faith. Id. at 5354. In 1977 Justice Brennan observed that the showings required to come within any of the Younger
exceptions were "probably impossible to make." Brennan, State Constitutionsand the Protection ofIndividual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 498 (1977).
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Younger abstention was developed to discourage the institution1 of
12
federal civil rights suits that threatened state criminal proceedings.
1 13
The Supreme Court gradually expanded Younger into the civil arena,
and then into the realm of administrative actions.1 14 The doctrine came
to mandate federal abstention from any state proceeding in which important state interests existed, so long as the federal plaintiff had an adequate state forum for his constitutional issues. 1 5
The Supreme Court's most recent Younger decision, Pennzoil Co. v.
Texaco, Inc. , 116 removes the last qualifications restraining federal abstention. As one commentator noted, "[t]he decision in Pennzoil implies that
no federal court may enjoin any state judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding, since any state interest will qualify as important and any state forumincluding the one whose proceedings are allegedly unconstitutional-will
' 17
qualify as adequate." "
Pennzoil sued Texaco in a Texas state court alleging that Texaco
had tortiously interfered with Pennzoil's contract to purchase Getty Oil
Co. Pennzoil obtained the largest civil judgment in history, $10.53 billion. 18 Under Texas law, the right to appeal was conditioned upon the
appellant posting a supersedeas bond in at least the amount of the judgment, plus interest and costs.' 19 Appeal for Texaco would have been
1 20
impossible, since it could not post a bond in that amount.
Before the Texas court entered its judgment, Texaco filed a complaint in federal court in New York, seeking to enjoin enforcement of the
112 Wechsler, Federal Courts, State CriminalLaw and the First Amendment, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 740, 86688 (1974); Whitten, Federal Declaratoryand Injunctive Interference with State Court Proceedings: The Supreme
Court and the Limits ofJudicialDiscretion, 53 N.C.L. REv. 591,649-53 (1975). Younger is ajudicial exception to the Anti-Injunction Act, which bars federal injunctions to stay pending state proceedings,
unless one of three statutory exceptions is met. In Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242-43 (1972),
decided the year after Younger, the Supreme Court held that § 1983 actions were "expressly authorized" exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act.
113 See Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 440-47 (1977) (applying Younger to an action by
welfare recipients challenging state attachment of their assets); Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415,423-35
(1979) (reversing lower court's interference with a pending state child abuse proceeding); Middlesex
County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 431-37 (1982) (establishing standards for ounger abstention in civil suits).
114 See Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Schools, Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 629 (1986)
(holding that the district court should have abstained from interfering with a state administrative
proceeding).
115 Comment, Civil Rights Suits that Interfere with Ongoing State CriminalProceedings: Younger Abstention in the ll'ake of Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 24 Hous. L. REV. 917, 919 (1987) [hereinafter
Younger Abstention in the Make of Pennzoil]. It should be noted that sending cases to state courts
simply transforms the "federal caseload" problem into a "state caseload" problem. Moreover, abstention is a particularly "clumsy tool for cleaning federal dockets because it requires the formal
retention of federal jurisdiction." Weinberg, The .VewJudicialFederalism, 29 STAN. L. REV. 1191, 1229
n.220 (1977).
116 481 U.S. 1 (1987).
117 Younger Abstention in the Wake of Pennzoil, supra note 115, at 919. See also Note, The Ultimate
Expansion of the Younger Doctrine: Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 41 Sw. LJ. 1055 (1988).
118 Post-judgment interest accrued at the rate of almost $3 million per day. Texaco, Inc. v.
Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133, 1138 (2d Cir. 1986), rev'd, 481 U.S. 1 (1987).
119 TEx. R. Civ. P. 364. Texas law allowed Pennzoil to levy execution on Texaco's assets unless
Texaco posted a sufficient bond and to secure a lien on Texaco's real property in Texas without
regard to the posting of a bond.
120 The Second Circuit estimated a worldwide cap on surety bonds ranging from $1 billion to
$1.5 billion. Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d at 1138.
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Texas judgment. One ground of Texaco's federal suit was a claim under
section 1983 that the application of the bond statute violated the due
process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. Texaco had
not raised these section 1983 claims in its post-trial motions in state
court.
The federal district court granted Texaco's application for a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the Texas statute on constitutional grounds, and also declared that the ongoing state proceeding did
not require abstention. 12 1 On appeal, the Second Circuit approved the
12 2
district court's exercise of jurisdiction over the constitutional claims.
The United States Supreme Court held that the federal district court
improperly failed to abstain from issuing the injunction. 12 3 The
Supreme Court concluded that because Texaco did not give the state
court the opportunity to adjudicate its constitutional claims, Texaco was
prevented from arguing in the federal action that Texas procedure was
deficient.124 Moreover, Justice Powell's opinion for the Court stated that
Younger applied because "the State's interests in the proceeding are so
important that exercise of the federal judicial power[s] would disregard
25
the comity between the States and the National Government."'
In a concurrence, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, criticized the plurality for reaching the Younger issue, which he viewed as inapplicable to either civil proceedings or to section 1983.126 Further,
according to Justice Brennan, even if Younger analysis is employed, abstention was still inappropriate. Justice Brennan observed that the
State's interest in the case was "negligible," because Texas' only interest
in the case was to assure that it was fairly adjudicated. 2 7 The concurrence additionally criticized the Court's requirement that a section 1983
suit claiming only violations of federal law be offered in the state
28

forum. 1

The implications of Pennzoil are alarming. First, a clear motivation
underlying the decision was the desire to conserve limited federal judicial
resources.' 2 9 The Court accomplished this result by requiring federal
civil rights plaintiffs to present their claims for decision in state courts.
Thus, Pennzoil develops an unprecedented theory of abstention as
" 'blind deference.' "130
121 The district court did require Texaco to post a $1 billion supersedeas bond. Texaco, Inc. v.
Pennzoil Co., 626 F. Supp. 250, 261-62 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 784 F.2d 1133 (2d
Cir. 1986), rev'd, 481 U.S. 1 (1987).
122 Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133 (2d Cir. 1986).
123 "In sum, the lower courts should have deferred on principles of comity to the pending state
proceedings. They erred in accepting Texaco's assertions as to the inadequacies of Texas procedure
to provide effective relief." Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 16 (1987).
124 Id.
125 Id. at 11.
126 Id. at 19 (Brennan, J., concurring).
127 Id.
128 Id. at 20-21 (Brennan, J., concurring).
129 Id. at 10-17. lounger did not acknowledge this rationale: its comity analysis was not couched
in terms of federal court inundation.
130 Id. at 20-21 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Younger v. Harris), 401 U.S. 34, 44 (1971)).
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Second, by requiring state court presentment of section 1983 claims,
Pennzoil appears to either import a judicial exhaustion requirement into
section 1983,131 or abolish the existence of the section 1983 exception to
the Anti-Injunction Act.' 3 2 While the Mitchum Court acknowledged that
federal suits brought under section 1983 would have to overcome the
Younger hurdle,1 3 3 Pennzoil virtually overrules the primary holding in
Mitchum that section 1983 is an exception to the Anti-Injunction Act.
Third, Pennzoil creates a novel presumption of state forum adequacy.' 3 4 This places civil rights plaintiffs in a losing situation. If they
choose to reserve their constitutional claims of abusive or improper process for a section 1983 action in federal court, the very state procedures
about which they complain are accorded a heavy presumption of validity.
Plaintiffs are forced to tender their constitutional claims in state court or
face Pennzoil-enhanced abstention risks in federal court. Thus, Pennzoil
both eliminates federal court protection from the unfair effects of state
court procedures and deprives section 1983 plaintiffs of a federal forum.
Fourth, the reasoning in Pennzoil strips the Younger "important state
interest" requirement of any content. While the plurality in Pennzoil
identified the interests of Texas as enforcing " 'the authority of the judicial system, so that its orders and judgments are not rendered nuga3 6
tory,' "135 this "state interest" exists in every lawsuit filed in any court. 1
In Pennzoil, the state judicial action was between two private litigants.
Pennzoil is the first Younger case in which the state plaintiff was not a state
official, but merely one acting "under color of" state law within the
meaning of section 1983. Virtually any challenge to a state proceeding
will constitute a threat to important state interests under Pennzoil. Since
a sine qua non of section 1983 suits is state action, perhaps all section 1983
suits will qualify.
The new Pennzoil criteria for Younger abstention tip the balance in
favor of federalism and against civil rights. Younger abstention is fast be131 Section 1983 is the principal federal court remedy for enforcing federal constitutional claims.
While state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over § 1983 actions, Martinez v. California, 444 U.S.
277 (1980), reh'g denied, 445 U.S. 920 (1980), there has never before been a statutory or judicial
obligation to offer § 1983 claims first in state court. Indeed, § 1983 specifically was created to provide a federal forum for plaintiffs whose civil rights have been infringed through unconstitutional
state action, claims that might be met with hostility in state courts. See H.R. REP. No. 548, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1, reprintedin 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWs 2609. No exhaustion of state
administrative remedies is required before a § 1983 action may be pursued in federal court. Patsy v.
Florida Bd. of Regents, 45 U.S. 496 (1982). If § 1983 claims are pursued first in state court, and
then again in the context of a federal proceeding, the state court ruling may be given preclusive
effect. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 105 (1980).
132 See supra note 112.
133 Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. at 243.
134 "[W]hen a litigant has not attempted to present his federal claims in related state court proceedings a federal court should assume that state procedures will afford an adequate remedy in the
absence of unambiguous authority to the contrary." Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil, Co., 481 U.S. 1, 15
(1987).
135 Id. at 13 (citations omitted) (quotingJuidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 336 (1979)).
136 In concurrence, Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Blackmun, Marshall and Stevens on this
point, argued that since Texas law directs state officials merely "to do Pennzoil's bidding in executing the judgment," only Pennzoil, not Texas, had an interest in the proceedings. Id. at 1530-31
(Brennan, J., concurring).
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coming the rule, rather than the exception. 3 7 Pennzoil requires the submission of section 1983 constitutional issues to the very forum which has
an interest in validating the constitutionality of its own procedures.
Under Pennzoil, abstention from interference with a pending state proceeding is almost mandatory, even when the State's interests are minimal, and even when a federal plaintiff is suffering constitutional abuses.
E.

Selective Activism in the Deferral and Acceptance of Cases

Abstention, preclusion, preemption and summary adjudication are
not the only mechanisms federal courts utilize to decrease their workload. 138 Increasingly, the federal judiciary is manipulating the issues it
chooses to decide by relying on doctrines ofjusticiability, the concepts of
ripeness, mootness and standing. The Supreme Court has written few
influential justiciability decisions in the past several years. But then, it
has not needed to. In the early and mid-1980's the Court issued a spate
of decisions which shaped the political focus of the justiciability doctrines
and dramatically reduced the volume of potential federal suits by diminishing the range of potential plaintiffs.
The expansion of public law litigation encouraged the development
of more restrictive doctrines of standing. 39 In Flast v. Cohen, 140 the
Court permitted taxpayers standing to challenge unconstitutional exercises of the congressional taxing and spending powers. In Valley Forge
Christian College v. Americans Unitedfor Separation of Church and State, 141 the
Court retreated from Flast and dramatically altered the course of the
standing inquiry. The Valley Forge rejection of taxpayer standing to assert
injury to religious autonomy 14 2 is in stark contrast to the Court's prior
recognition that "if the Congress enacted a statute creating such a legal
137

Formerly, the Supreme Court held:
[A]bstention ...is an extraordinary and narrow exception to the duty of a District Court to
adjudicate a controversy properly before it. Abdication of the obligation to decide cases
can be justified under this doctrine only in the exceptional circumstances where the order
to the parties to repair to the State court would clearly serve an important countervailing
interest.
Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813 (1976) (quoting
County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188-89 (1959)).
138 Removal and remand are not explored in depth here. However, the decision last Term in
Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. CohilI, 108 S. Ct. 614 (1988), recognized for the first time an inherent
power in federal district courts to remand a properly removed case in which the federal claims have
been eliminated and only pendent state claims remain. The Carnegie-Mellon dissenters-ChiefJustice
Rehnquist and Justices White and Scalia-contended that remand should be permitted only for reasons authorized by statute. Id. at 622-23 (White, J., dissenting). However, the dissent maintained
that wholesale dismissal was an available and preferable alternative. Id. at 625-26.
139 Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976); Monaghan,
ConstitutionalAdjudication: The Who and ll'hen, 82 YALE LJ. 1363 (1973).
140 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
141 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
142 The Court stated:
Were we to recognize standing premised on an 'injury' consisting solely of an alleged violation of a 'personal constitutional right' to a government that does not establish religion, a
principled consistency would dictate recognition of respondents' standing to challenge execution of every capital sentence on the basis of a personal right to a government that does
not impose cruel and unusual punishment, or standing to challenge every affirmative-action
program on the basis of a personal right to a government that does not deny equal protection of the laws ....
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right, the requisite injury for standing would be found in an invasion of
1 43
that right."
While Valley Forge requires plaintiffs to show "personal injury suffered by them as a consequence of the alleged constitutional error, other
than the psychological consequence presumably produced by observation of conduct with which one disagrees,"'' 4 4 the. Court gave little content to its personal injury standard.' 4 5 In fact, "injury" adjudication has
in practice devolved to intuitive merits determinations based on the indi46
vidual judge's personal evaluations of whether the plaintiff was hurt.
Arguably, the real tightening of standing requirements has not focused
on Article III injury-in-fact, but instead has concentrated on the equally
manipulable issues of causation, 4 7 prudential requirements 148 and the
149
tying of standing to the specific relief requested.
In Allen v. Wright,' 5 0 parents of black public school students sought
to challenge the legality of certain Internal Revenue Service guidelines
that allegedly permitted racially discriminatory private schools to achieve
tax-exempt status. The Allen Court denied standing because the plaintiffs had failed to show personal injury, since the plaintiffs had not applied for admission to any of the private schools.' 5 ' In analyzing the
standing question of redressability, the Court examined the substantive
issues and found that "the plaintiff failed to allege that there were
enough racially discriminatory private schools receiving tax exemptions
in respondents' communities for withdrawal of those exemptions
to
' 52
make an appreciable difference in public school integration."'
Importantly, Allen introduced a new factor into the standing equation: separation of powers concerns. The core of the majority's analysis
Id. at 489 n.26 (citation omitted).
Arguably, the ['alley Forge Court still would permit a taxpayer to challenge the validity of congressional spending action which violates the establishment clause. Id. at 479-80.
143 Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 224 n.14 (1974) (emphasis
added). Indeed, as one commentator has noted, "[c]onstitutional rights seem to score lower than
rights reflected in the Code of Federal Regulations and 'past practices' of an administrative agency."
Burnham, Injuy for Standing Purposes When ConstitutionalRights Are Violated: Common Law Public Value
Adjudication at Work, 13 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 57, 73 n.87 (1985) (citations omitted).
144 454 U.S. at 485 (emphasis in original).
145 Commentators have advocated a diametrically opposite approach: that the standing test
should be satisfied by a litigant who alleges no injury to his own interests, yet who establishes the
existence of a concrete dispute and the ability to fairly represent one side of the issue. See, e.g., Jaffe,
The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Von-Hohfeldian or Ideological Plaintil, 116 U. PA. L. REv.
1033, 1037-47 (1968); Tushnet, The Sociology ofArticle III: A Response to ProfessorBrilmayer, 93 HARV. L.
REV. 1698, 1706-07 (1980).
146 Compare Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Zielke, 845 F.2d 1463, 1467-68 (7th Cir.
1988) (city resident and president of freedom from religion organization lacked injury sufficient to
confer standing to challenge constitutionality of Ten Commandments monument on display in city
park) with Saladin v. City of Milledgeville, 812 F.2d 687, 691-95 (11 th Cir. 1987) (plaintiffs receiving
correspondence on city stationery with seal bearing the word "Christianity" suffered adequate spiritual injury for standing purposes).
147 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
148 Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
149 See infra text accompanying notes 156-61 for a discussion of City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461
U.S. 95 (1983).
150 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
151 Id. at 746.
152 Id. at 758.
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was that federal courts are not the appropriate forum for "general complaints about the way in which government goes about its business." 1 53
Ironically, Allen has prompted lower federal courts to restrict access in
the name of deference to coordinate branches that created the rightsinfringing policies.1 54 Now, "the most injurious and widespread Government actions c[an] be questioned by nobody."' 15 5
Similarly, in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 15 6 the Court stretched to
reach the standing question and then fashioned a doctrine that expanded
standing requirements. The Court held that Lyons had no standing to
seek an injunction to prohibit the Los Angeles Police Department from
using life threatening chokeholds.1 5 7 Blurring the mootness and standing inquiries, the Court held that Lyons had no standing to seek injunctive relief because he failed to establish a "real and immediate threat"
that he again would be subjected to a chokehold.15 8 By collapsing mootness analysis into a standing inquiry, the Court again broadened its
standing requirements. The Lyons demand for the probability of individual recurrence to satisfy the standing test in injunction cases constructs
an impossible barrier to litigants who want to prevent harm to themselves or others.' 59
153 Id. at 760.
154 InJorman v. Veterans Admin., 830 F.2d 1420, 1428 n.10 (7th Cir. 1987), for example, the
plaintiffs established that during the 1970's, a segregated all-white neighborhood became a segregated all-black neighborhood. Plaintiff's expert testified that the rapid resegregation of the area was
due to an infusion of Federal Housing Administration and Veterans Administration ("VA") lending
in the area. In 1976, the year of highest turnover, "61% of the homes were sold with governmentassisted financing." Id. at 1426 n.9. The lower court chose to believe defendant's expert who testified that the "influx of government-assisted loans was merely a symptom that tends to accompany
resegregation." Id. at 1423. The court of appeals upheld the finding that the plaintiff lacked standing because the injuries they suffered were not "fairly traceable" to VA lending practices. Id. at
1424. The appellate court relied on Allen's separation of powers logic to remove challenges to government agency programs from the purview of federal court adjudication absent an "unusually
heavy" burden, id. at 1425, on plaintiffs to show that the government funding was a substantial
factor in hastening "the inevitable resegregation." Id. at 1426.
Similarly, in Kurtz v. Baker, 829 F.2d 1133 (D.C. Cir. 1987), a divided panel of the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals held that a nontheist professor of philosophy lacked standing to challenge refusal of the United States Senate and House of Representatives to invite nontheists to deliver secular remarks during the chambers' morning prayer sessions. The truly muddled majority
opinion seemed to rely in large part on the separation of powers principle to deny the plaintiff
standing. Id. at 1138, 1140. As the dissent trenchantly observed, the majority even seemed to create
a new category for standing inquiries: those cases that involve the exercise of legislative, but not
"congressional" actions. Id. at 1148 n.4 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). While Kurtz may well have
lacked a tenable constitutional claim, the majority's injury-in-fact analysis relies on the separation of
powers to gratuitously place many claims beyond judicial competence.
155 United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669,
688 (1973).
156 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
157 By the time the case reached the Supreme Court, the police department had changed its
chokehold policies. Thus, Lyons himself argued the case was moot. However, the Court leaped the
mootness hurdle by holding that the chokehold policy could be reenacted. Id. at 101. See also Fallon,
Ofjusticiability, Remedies, and Public Law Litigation: Votes on theJurisprudenceof Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REv.
1, 25 (1984).
158 461 U.S. at 105-07. While Lyons was moving up the ladder of appellate review, six people
were choked to death by Los Angeles police pursuant to the chokehold policy. Id. at 116 n.3.
159 In Travelers Social Club v. City of Pittsburgh, 685 F. Supp. 929, 932-35 (W.D. Pa. 1988), a
private club whose members were almost exclusively homosexuals sought declaratory and injunctive
relief against various city law enforcement agencies and officials for engaging in insulting and assaultive behavior while conducting a Valentine's Day raid on the club, allegedly to search for liquor
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The thesis that standing decisions are a tool for the pre-merits manipulation of issues to be decided is not novel.' 60 What is important for
present purposes is the way past standing decisions have circumscribed
the number and the type of cases and plaintiffs that may sue in federal
court. As the dissenters in Lyons noted, an "entire class" of constitutional litigation was removed from the reach of the federal courts' equity
powers. "The federal judicial power is now limited to levying a toll for
6
such a systematic constitutional violation."' '
Standing cases are parallelled by ripeness decisions, which often involve the use of justiciability standards to make substantive rulings. 162
The ripeness determination may be simply that the claim presented is
too "abstract,"'' 6 3 or that the issue is not an "appropriate" one for judicial decision.' 64 While the ripeness doctrine was intended to avoid "premature adjudication,"'' 6 5 ripeness also has become a selective barrier to
66
federal litigation.'
The Court's willingness to employ doctrines ofjudicial restraint in a
selective manner reached a pinnacle in Michigan v. Long.167 After the
Michigan Supreme Court reversed Long's conviction, Long opposed the
state's petition for certiorari. Long argued the Michigan Constitution afforded him more protection against improper searches and seizures than
the federal Constitution, and that this independent and adequate state
ground precluded federal review. While the Supreme Court ruled that
clearly stated "separate, adequate, and independent [state] grounds"
would avoid federal review, the Court also ruled that, when it was unclear
whether a state decision rested on federal or state grounds, it would presume the decision rested on federal law and would have jurisdiction to
review the case. 168 Long thus reversed the traditional presumption-that
a state decision premised on both state and federal grounds was prelaw violations. Although the plaintiffs presented expert testimony that officers were likely to engage
in repeated abusive behavior in the future, the court flatly rejected the evidence regarding recurrence as insufficient based on Lyons. See also Coverdell v. Department of Social and Health Serv., 834
F.2d 758, 766-67 (9th Cir. 1987) (plaintiff who sought injunctive relief against a social worker who
had seized her newborn child at a hospital failed to demonstrate the possibility of repetition, since
the court found she did not show she was still capable of childbearing-even though she subsequently had another child-and because the protective services worker had not seized her next
child).
160 See Tushnet, supra note 145, at 1715 n.72 ("Doesn't the fact that the Court issues so many
inconsistent decisions tend to indicate that the entire concept of standing is awfully prone to manipulation and incoherence?"). See also Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem ofSelf-Governance,
40 STAN. L. REV. 1371 (1988).
161 461 U.S. at 137 (Marshall, Brennan, Blackmun and Stevens, J.J., dissenting).
162 See Nichol, Ripeness and the Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 170 (1987) ("[ilt is probably a
mistake to characterize this method of analysis as jurisdictional at all.").
163 Socialist Labor Party v. Gilligan, 406 U.S. 583, 586 (1972).
164 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 509 (1961).
165 Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967).
166 Compare Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. 489 (1982) (holding that a vendor's equal protection challenge to a statute prohibiting the sale of drug paraphernalia
materials was not ripe because there was no evidence of discriminatory enforcement) with Freedman
v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 52-60 (1965) (striking down a film censorship statute that posed a significant risk of discriminatory implementation).
167 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
168 Id. at 1040-41.
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sumed to rest on independent
state grounds-to favor federal review of
69
state court decisions.'
Long seems to vastly expand the reach of federal court jurisdiction.
Indeed, it appears to invite wholesale importation of the bulk of state
criminal litigation into federal court. 170 However, this betrayal of the
overburdened federal docket serves ulterior purposes. The jurisdictional
presumption in favor of Supreme Court review only becomes important
when a state court affords a more expansive view of individual rights than
would be available under the federal Constitution. 17 1 This has been precisely the effect of Long: subsequent decisions have shown the Supreme
Court's proclivity to review state decisions under Long primarily when
the Court wants to rein in expansive constitutional interpretations by
state courts. 172
Long can be interpreted as an attempt to prevent the states from interpreting. federal constitutional law expansively to protect the rights of
criminal defendants.1 73 However, since the Court must exercise jurisdiction to review protective individual rights decisions, it may also indicate
that when caseload and conservatism clash, the Supreme Court is more
interested in fostering its political goals. In fact, Long may even signify
that the scarcity ofjudicial resources is not actually the driving force behind many decisions but rather a tool to further a conservative agenda.
In short, the judicial restraint decisions exhibit selective restraint. The
doctrines of the early 1980's were crafted to both reduce the volume of
cases the federal courts must entertain and to permit the courts greater
opportunity to engage in pre-merits adjudication. The Court's aggressive protection of law enforcement interests is unmatched174by its decisions
concerning the substantive rights of individual citizens.
III.

Narrowing the Scope of Substantive Rights

The decisions adjusting jurisdictional theories are but one method
of reducing the federal court's workload. An equally important way the
courts are cutting back their caseload is by limiting the parameters of
those rights that may be redressed in federal court. Narrowing the reach
169 See, e.g., Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 128 (1945).
170 In dissent, Justice Stevens envisioned a "docket swollen with requests by States to reverse
judgments that their courts have rendered in favor of their citizens." 463 U.S. at 1070 (Stevens, J,
dissenting).
171 If the state decision is clearly based on the state constitution, it has independent and adequate
state grounds. If the state decision offers less protection than it should under the federal Constitution, the latter is open to Supreme Court review without the Long presumption. See Comment,
Supreme Court Review of State Court Cases: PrincipledFederalismor Selective Bias, 36 EMORY L.J. 1277, 1287
(1987) ("The new presumption of Long, therefore, would operate to expand the Court's review of
state decisions that overcompensate for violations of federal guarantees, because only judgments
consistent with the federal Constitution can be supported on state grounds").
172 See, e.g., United States v. Benchimol, 471 U.S. 453,458 (1985) (BrennanJ., dissenting) (noting
that 24 of the Court's 27 summary reversals were of decisions rendered in favor of non-capital criminal defendants); Florida v. Meyers, 466 U.S. 380, 383 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (observing the
Court's propensity to grant petitions for certiorari on behalf of the state and then reverse lower
court reversals of convictions).
173 Such an interpretation is consistent with the substantive criminal procedure decisions emanating from the Supreme Court. See infra text accompanying notes 222-44.
174 See infra text accompanying notes 177-221.
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of substantive constitutional rights also appeals to the majoritarian impulses of the New Federalist judges, who correctly perceive the
countermajoritarian premise of constitutional rights. 175 These cutbacks
in substantive rights have been achieved by the Burger and Rehnquist
Courts' refusals to extend established rights to reach the demands of new
17 6
situations and by their whittling away at particularly disfavored rights.
A.

The Failure to Expand Rights

Although privacy is not a specifically enumerated constitutional
right, the Supreme Court has recognized that certain aspects of privacy
are embodied as part of the fifth and fourteenth amendment concepts of
liberty, due process, and equal protection, 7 7 the rights reserved to the
people under the ninth amendment, 178 the privileges and immunities
clause of article IV,179 and the penumbras of the first, third, fourth and
fifth amendments. 8 0 Privacy protection has been extended to decisions
concerning marital choice, 8 1 the ability to procreate, 8 2 contraceptive
use by unmarried couples, 8 3 the right to possess pornography, 84 and
abortion.18 5
Recently, however, in Bowers v. Hardwick,' 8 6 the Supreme Court
ruled that a Georgia statute criminalizing consensual sodomy did not violate the privacy rights of homosexuals. To arrive at this conclusion, the
Bowers majority stringently distinguished the earlier privacy cases as limited to rights associated with family, marriage and procreation. 8 7 The
Court then concluded that the right to engage in private, consensual oral
or anal sex was unrelated to those family-oriented rights.
Bowers is a sad chapter in the history of class oppression.1 8 8 More
fundamentally, it is an example of the Supreme Court's combined refusal
to adapt constitutional guarantees to new situations and unwillingness to
broaden the ambit of privacy rights. Prior cases establishing the right of
175 See A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 112 (1970); Bishin,Judicial
Review in Democratic Theoiy, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 1099, 1117 (1977); Sherry, Issue Manipulation by the
Burger Court: Saving the Community from Itself, 70 MINN. L. REV. 611, 613 (1986).
176 See Wright, supra note 60, at 492. Judge Wright maintains that although the Burger Court has
been reluctant to expressly overrule the Warren Court's landmark decisions, it has damaged those
rights by smaller encroachments and failures of adaptation.
177 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541
(1942); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 397 (1923).
178 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486-99 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
179 See, e.g., Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 200 (1973).
180 See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
181 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
182 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942).
183 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-55 (1972).
184 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S 557, 565 (1969). Although Stanley was technically decided on first
amendment grounds, the privacy theme was recognized in later opinions. See, e.g., United States v.
Reidel, 402 U.S. 351, 356 (1971) (Stanley's focus was "on freedom of mind and thought and on the
privacy of one's home").
185 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
186 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
187 Id. at 189-92.
188 See, e.g., Stoddard, Bowers v. Hardwick: Precedent By PersonalPredilection, 54 U. Cm. L. REV.
648, 649 (1987) ("the Court's opinion in Hardwick rests upon nothing more substantial than the
collective distaste of the five justices in the majority for the conduct under scrutiny").
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unmarried persons to use contraceptives, to terminate pregnancies, and
to possess pornography indicate that privacy rights extend to sexual intimacy and autonomy.' 8 9 Consensual sexual conduct' 90 falls squarely
within the logic of prior decisions that expanded privacy rights beyond
the borders of marital sexual relations.
Bowers uses consensus values as a touchstone for the scope of privacy
rights. 19 In concurrence, Chief Justice Burger supported the Court's
ruling that the sodomy statute was constitutional by reference to "millennia of moral teaching."' 9 2 Thus, Bowers circumscribes the right to privacy by majoritarian opinion.
The Bowers' Court's concern for federalism far outweighs its interest
in establishing a zone of personal inviolability. Writing for the majority,
Justice White emphasized the constraints of federalism:
The Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when
it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the Constitution .... There
should be, therefore, great resistance to expand the substantive reach
of those Clauses, particularly if it requires redefining the category of
rights deemed to be fundamental. Otherwise, the Judiciary necessarily
takes to itself further authority to govern the country without express
constitutional authority. The claimed right
pressed on us today falls
9
far short of overcoming this resistance.1 3
Bowers, narrow confinement of privacy rights is part of a trend to
reduce the quantum of cognizable substantive rights. This latest step is
consonant with the Court's limits on the rights of other less favored
classes. In Bell v. Wolfish, 194 the Court approved body cavity searches of
pretrial detainees on the basis of "legitimate" prison security interests.' 9 5 In O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz,19 6 the Supreme Court held that a
minimal "reasonableness" standard should be used to review the validity
of prison regulations that curtail prisoners' free exercise rights. 9 7 Simi189 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 153; Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. at 453-54; Stanley v. Georgia,
394 U.S. at 568.
190 The Georgia statute did not distinguish between homosexual and heterosexual conduct.
However, the Bowers Court explicitly confined its privacy analysis to the rights of homosexuals. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 189-96.
191 Id. at 192 (Proscriptions against consensual sodomy "have ancient roots .... Sodomy was a
criminal offense at common law and was forbidden by the laws of the original 13 States when they
ratified the Bill of Rights.").
192 Id. at 197 (Burger, J., concurring).
193 Id. at 194-95.
194 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
195 The opinion did not discuss suspicion, nor did it address whether the detainees could reasonably conceal contraband while they were wearing a one-piece jumpsuit. The Court cited a single
instance of an inmate attempting a body cavity concealment, and reasoned that the search technique
would be an effective deterrent. Id. at 559.
196 482 U.S. 342 (1987).
197 Prior to Shabazz appellate courts had employed heightened scrutiny standards to prisoner free
exercise cases, depending upon the breadth of the regulations and the level of first amendment
infringement. See, e.g., Shabazz v. Barnauskas, 790 F.2d 1536, 1539 (11 th Cir. 1986) (deciding that
restrictions of free exercise rights must be no greater than necessary to protect government interests); Abdul Wali v. Coughlin, 754 F.2d 1015, 1033 (2d Cir. 1985) (requiring a higher level of review
for regulations resulting in an absolute deprivation of prisoners' first amendment rights). See Blischak, O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz: The State of Prisoners' Religious Free ExerciseRights, 37 AM. U. L. REv.
453, 467-71 (1988) (discussing prior decisions' more lenient and adaptive standards).
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larly, in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,198 the Court refused to
expand the list of suspect classes for equal protection purposes to include the mentally retarded, despite substantial similarities between the
retarded and other powerless classes who are afforded greater
protection.199
This past Term, in Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools, 20 0 the Court
addressed an equal protection challenge to a North Dakota statute permitting certain school districts to assess a user fee for bus transportation.
The appellant school child and her mother, whose family income was at
or near the poverty line, refused to sign the busing contract, arranged for
alternate transportation to school and began an action to enjoin the
school district from collecting any fee for bus service. The United States
Supreme Court held that although the child was poor and although the
20 1
right involved was education, the user fee statute was constitutional.
The Court rejected Kadrmas' equal protection challenge in sweeping
right and poverty is
terms, holding that education is not a fundamental
20 2
not a status deserving of strict scrutiny.
The Court's holding that a school district can constitutionally deny
access to transportation for an indigent child who lives sixteen miles
from school seems fundamentally at odds with precedent attesting to the
importance of equal educational opportunities. 20 3 Equally perplexing
are the variety of less comprehensive alternative rulings rejected by the
Court. 20 4 The Court's prior treatment of indigency-related equal protection challenges has exhibited a careful analysis of the effect of poverty on
the particular right at issue. 20 5 Rather than conduct a perceptive examination of the interplay of the petitioner's indigent status and the right
affected, the Kadrmas Court divides and conquers, rejecting education as
a right not significant enough and indigency as a status not desperate
enough to trigger any heightened form of scrutiny. Indeed, in its flat
rejection of indigency as a suspect classification, the Kadrmas majority
seemed determined to establish a bright-line test, perhaps to keep future
impoverished plaintiffs from troubling the Court with factors that might
call for more sensitive constitutional inquiry.
198 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
199 This analysis does not portend well for other politically powerless classes. See Reid, Law,
Politics and the Homeless, 89 W. VA. L. REv. 115 (1986). Cf. Black, FurtherReflections on the Constitutional
Justice of Livelihood, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 1103 (1986); Edelman, The Net Century of Our Constitution:
Rethinking Our Duty to the Poor, 39 HASTINGS LJ. 1 (1987). See also Lyng v. International Union,
United Auto., Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of Am., UAW, 108 S. Ct. 1184 (1988)
(upholding against first amendment and equal protection challenges Food Stamp Act provisions
denying food stamps to households of striking union workers).
200 108 S. Ct. 2481 (1988).
201 Id. at 2491.
202 Id. at 2487.
203 See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
204 For example, the Court could have declined to reach the merits, since Kadrmas had arranged
for alternative transportation to schooL
205 See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 380-81 (1971) (given the associational interests
implicated by the marital relationship, Connecticut's divorce court fees and costs requirement constituted a denial of due process to indigents); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17 n.11 (1956) (state

law imposing a set fee for trial transcript was fair on its face, but "grossly discriminatory in its
operation").
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The borders of equal protection were narrowed in a different way in
McCleskey v. Kemp. 2 06 In McCleskey the defendant challenged the constitutionality of the Georgia death penalty procedure on eighth and fourteenth amendment grounds. McCleskey, a black, was convicted and
sentenced to death for killing a white police officer. In his petition for
habeas relief, McCleskey submitted statistical studies establishing that
defendants charged with killing whites were 4.3 times more likely to be
sentenced to death than defendants charged with killing blacks. 20 7 McCleskey also maintained that black murderers are more likely to receive
the death penalty than white murderers.
The Supreme Court rejected McCleskey's equal protection claims.
The Court held that to establish an equal protection violation, the defendant must show either that a law is enacted by a state legislature "because of an anticipated racially discriminatory effect" 20 8 or is administered
by the decisionmaker in his case with a discriminatory purpose. 20 9 Since
the Georgia capital sentencing scheme was facially neutral and administered in McCleskey's case without intent to discriminate, McCleskey's
proof of disparate impact alone was insufficient to establish an equal protection violation.
The majority acknowledged that in the past statistical proof of discriminatory intent has been accepted in employment discrimination and
venire selection cases. 2 10 However, the Court distinguished those cases
from capital sentencing cases on the basis of the greater number of variables relevant to the death penalty decision and on the sentencer's lack
of ability to rebut or explain the statistical disparity.2 1' The majority expressed concern that the opposite result would open the door to equal
protection challenges by a whole host of unwelcome groups with a vari21 2
ety of possible complaints.
206 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
207 These studies were conducted by Professor David Baldus and Dr. George Woodworth of the
University of Iowa. The "Baldus study" was actually two studies that examined over 2000 murder
cases in Georgia. See McCleskey v. Zant, 580 F. Supp. 338, 353 (N.D. Ga. 1984). These multiple
regression studies took into consideration 230 variables that might otherwise explain sentence disparities. Id. at 361.
208 481 U.S. at 298 (emphasis in original).
209 Id. at 292.
210 Id. at 293-94.
211 Id. at 296. The majority ignored the controls in the Baldus study that discounted the effects
of 230 other variables.
212 [T]he claim that [the] sentence rests on the irrelevant factor of race easily could be extended to apply to claims based on unexplained discrepancies that correlate to membership
in other minority groups and even to gender. Similarly. ... other claims could apply with
equally logical force to statistical disparities that correlate with the race or sex of other
actors in the criminal justice system, such as defense attorneys orjudges. Also, there is no
logical reason that such a claim need be limited to racial or sexual bias. If arbitrary and
capricious punishment is the touchstone under the Eighth Amendment, such a claim
could-at least in theory-be based upon any arbitrary variable, such as the defendant's
facial characteristics, or the physical attractiveness of the defendant or the victim, that some
statistical study indicates may be influential injury decisionmaking.
Id. at 315-16 (footnotes omitted). The argument that troupes of plaintiffs with various physical
characteristics will march to the courthouse is underwhelming. Social science data sufficient to establish a claim of disparate treatment is not easily created, as the development of the studies used in

AlcCleskey attests. See McCleskey v. Zant, 580 F. Supp. 338, 354-73 (N.D. Ga. 1984).
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The Court also circumscribed the eighth amendment inquiry by
holding that McCleskey had not proven the Georgia sentencing procedure operated in an arbitrary or capricious manner, because he failed to
demonstrate that other similarly situated defendants "did not receive the
death penalty." 2 13 The Court relegated McCleskey's statistical proof to
the realm of inconsequence by holding that his statistics showed "only a
likelihood that a particular factor entered into some decisions. '2 14 Concluding its eighth amendment analysis by holding that the statistical disparities established in the Baldus study were not comparable to the
systemic defects identified in prior death penalty decisions, the McCleskey
majority observed that "[a]pparent disparities in sentencing are an inevi'2 15
table part of our criminal justice system.
The great failing of McCleskey is its unwillingness to extend current
equal protection analysis into an uncharted area. McCleskey met the requirements of a traditional equal protection claim. He demonstrated
that he was a member of a group that had been singled out for substantially different treatment and the degree to which his sentence depended
on racial factors. 2 16 The McCleskey Court, however, departed from established fourteenth amendment jurisprudence and created a standard of
personal discriminatory intent for capital cases. 2 17 As Justice Blackmun
observed in dissent, "the Court relies on the very fact that this is a case
involving capital punishment to apply a lesser standard of scrutiny under
'21 8
the Equal Protection Clause.
Not only are the proof problems in establishing an equal protection
violation by showing personal discriminatory intent virtually insurmountable, the standard is hopeless for achieving fourteenth amendment goals.
The eradication of a history of class oppression requires the acceptance
of measurement techniques capable of pinpointing the subtle effects of
21 9
discrimination.
The McCleskey Court's refusal to apply traditional equal protection
analysis in a capital case on the spurious basis of an overabundance of
variables 2 20 attests to the Court's fear of the "judicial analogue to the
domino theory." 221 The Court's reluctance to open death penalty litigation to further constitutional challenges by other disadvantaged groups
is a prime example of the fusion of two Court sentiments: fear of a profusion of litigation and aversion to elaborating the rights of a disfavored
group.
213 481 U.S. at 307 (emphasis in original).
214 Id. at 308.
215 Id. at 312 (footnote omitted).
216 Id. at 353 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Claims of discrimination as evidenced by statistics have
long been accepted in other realms. See, e.g., Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
217 481 U.S. at 297.
218 481 U.S. at 348 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
219 See generally Lawrence, The Id, The Ego and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39
STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987).

220 The majority failed to acknowledge that the Baldus study specifically controlledfor extraneous
factors.
221 Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment and the Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 1388, 1409 (1988).
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The combination of current Supreme Court conservatism and antipathy toward a large caseload is producing narrow interpretations of existing rights. This subtle activism has taken the form of a failure to
expand current rights to situations that fall squarely within the logic of
prior decisions. These flat refusals by the Supreme Court to vindicate
minority rights and the hesitancy to enforce existing rights reduces the
sheer number of rights suits with which the federal courts must grapple-it sets a ceiling on the rights available for use.
B.

The Reduction of Existing Rights

In the realm of criminal procedure the Supreme Court has taken a
markedly activist approach. This campaign has been targeted toward an
expansion of governmental power and prerogative and a correlative reduction in individual interests and claims. As Justice Brennan capsulized, a 2majority of the Supreme Court appears to fear "too much
22
justice."
Perhaps the most sweeping of the recent criminal procedure decisions is United States v. Salerno.223 In Salerno the Court upheld the preventive detention provision of the 1984 Bail Reform Act against facial due
process and eighth amendment challenges. The specific portion of the
Act at issue permits detention prior to trial if "the judicial officer finds
that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure...
the safety of any other person and the community." 224 Salerno appealed
his detention, arguing that pretrial detention based on a prediction of
2 25
future dangerousness was unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court stated that "there is nothing inherently unattainable about a prediction of future criminal conduct" and that the Bail
Reform Act's procedural safeguards were intended to improve the judicial officer's proficiency at predicting dangerousness. 2 26 The Court further found that detention under the Act is a regulatory rather than a
punitive measure, and that the conditions of pretrial detention are not
excessive in relation to the state's interests in safeguarding the community.2 27 In a strident dissent, Justice Marshall observed that the major-

ity's analysis would permit Congress to characterize any pretrial
punishment as "regulatory" and thus evade strict due process
scrutiny.

228

The Bail Reform Act's procedural requirements mandate full consideration of conditional release as an alternative to detention. 2 29 Moreover, the Salerno majority envisioned a "full-blown adversary hearing" in
222 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 339 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
223 107 S. Ct. 279 (1987).
224 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (Supp. IV 1986).
225 481 U.S. at 744-45.
226 107 S. Ct. at 2103-04 (quoting Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 278 (1984)).
227 Id. at 2101.
228 Id. at 2108 (Marshall,J., dissenting). Justice Marshall also noted that Salerno was the first time
the Court had upheld a "statute in which Congress declares that a person innocent of any crime may
be jailed indefinitely." Id. at 2105-06.
229 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (Supp. IV 1986).
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federal court for each contested detention application. 23 0 However, the
assumption of procedural protection undergirding the Salerno opinion
has not come to pass. Many courts are failing to explore the adequacy of
detention alternatives. 2323' 2Many more courts are failing to afford extensive detention hearings.
The Salerno ruling approves a constitutionally abusive process. Salerno permits the detention of presumptively innocent citizens absent
proof of dangerousness beyond a reasonable doubt. The procedural
safeguards on which the Salerno Court rested its decision have not been
forthcoming, since the evidentiary hearing, consideration of individual
defendants' "dangerousness," and evaluation of alternatives to detention
demands more time and attention than many federal district courts
have. 23 3 Thus, the statutory authorization of preventive detention is be-

23 4
ing interpreted as a mandate for detention.
But if Salerno calls for a commitment of court time and resources to
the attention of criminal defendants' rights, how does it fit the overload
pattern? Perhaps it is too uncharitable to view Salerno as a hoax. However, if district courts are overburdened, they may simply afford less procedural protection to those accused of crimes. Salerno also picks up the
refrain of the second overload theme: When the Supreme Court must
choose between a course that arrives at a rights-narrowing outcome and
one which adds to the caseload strain, the Supreme Court will sacrifice
judicial time in favor of rights-restriction. The Court's concern for the
federal caseload yields to its desire to restrict substantive rights. This
may signify that overload is a facile problem-a tool to reach a political
outcome, rather than an end itself.
The collective impact of several other criminal procedure decisions
is equally forceful. In Maryland v. Garrison,23 5 the Supreme Court approved a search, even though the police searched the wrong apartment.
Despite a clear violation of the warrant requirement, 2 36 the Court ruled
that the officers had made a good faith mistake, and since their conduct
230 107 S. Ct. at 2103. This statement is disingenuous at best, coming from a majority that has
repeatedly recognized the time constraints and caseload burdens of the lower federal courts.
231 Note, Limiting Preventive Detention Through ConditionalRelease: The Unfulfilled Promise of the 1982
PretrialServices Act, 97 YALE L.J. 320, 322 (1987).
232 See, e.g., United States v. Friedman, 837 F.2d 48, 49-50 (2d Cir. 1988) (reversing district court
order which contained only implicit findings relating to risk of flight); United States v.Jackson, 823
F.2d 4, 6 (2d Cir. 1987) ("[r]ather than making explicit findings of fact, however, the [district] court
relied principally on the statutory presumption that no conditions can reasonably assure a defendant's presence at trial where the defendant is charged with a narcotics offense with a possible penalty
of imprisonment for ten years or more"); United States v. Bell, 673 F. Supp. 1429 (E.D. Mich. 1987)
("there is nothing in the record to suggest that the government or defendant actually addressed the
question of appropriate conditions of release").
233 See, e.g., United States v. Spilotro, 786 F.2d 808, 815 (8th Cir. 1986) (permitting the district
court to amend sua sponte at any time the conditions of release, because "requiring a remand of the
case to the releasing judicial officer in order to amend conditions of release could waste limited
judicial resources").
234 In United States v. Bess, 678 F. Supp. 929 (D.D.C. 1988), the district court affirmed the magistrate's sua sponte invocation of the statutory presumption of dangerousness for a crime with which
the defendant had not been formally charged.
235 480 U.S. 79 (1987).
236 Id. at 90 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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would not be deterrable by invoking the exclusionary rule, the evidence
23 7
obtained was admissible.
In fifth amendment jurisprudence, the Court similarly expanded the
scope of permissible governmental action. In Colorado v. Connelly,2 38 the
Supreme Court ruled that a criminal defendant's confession is involuntary only if it was coerced by the government. Thus, confessions coerced
by private individuals or compelled by mental illness are constitutionally
admissible. 2 39 The Connelly Court stretched to decide the constitutional
issues. As one commentator noted, "[t]he Court could have held simply
that a suspect's own psyche cannot unconstitutionally 'compel' him to
confess." 24 0 Instead, the Court held that only police-coerced confessions
are involuntary. Justice Brennan drew the unavoidable conclusion: confessions "coerced by parties other than police officers are now considered 'voluntary.' "241 The Court's antipathy toward the exclusionary rule
is matched only by its lack of concern for the rights of criminal defendants. 24 2 Connelly finds a home for both of these biases.

The Court is whittling away at constitutional protection for criminal
defendants. Examples abound of the High Court's active constriction of
criminal defendants' rights. Of course, this is nothing new. 243 What distinguishes many of these recent decisions from their lineal predecessors
is the transformative impact the new decisions will have on the caseload
of the federal courts. 244 The sweep of recent cases will cordon off exten237 Id. at 84-89. See also Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987) (approving a good faith search
pursuant to a statute later determined unconstitutional). But see Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321
(1987) (holding police manipulation of an item to check for identification numbers not within the
"plain view" exception to the fourth amendment).
238 479 U.S. 157 (1986).
239 The Connelly Court stated that the fifth amendment's "sole concern ... is governmental coercion .... [not] 'moral and psychological pressures to confess emanating from sources other than
official coercion.' " Id. at 170 (quoting Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 305 (1985)), and that "[t]he
most outrageous behavior by a private party.., does not make that evidence inadmissible." Id. at
166.
240 Survey, Leading Cases-ConstitutionalLaw-Criminal Law and Procedure, 101 HARV. L. REV. 119,
185 (1987).
241 Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 176 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
242 Criminal defendants have fared no better in fourth amendment jurisprudence. See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. 1625 (1988) (fourth amendment does not prohibit warrantless
search and seizure of trash left for collection); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987) (upholding
a warrantless search of a government employee's office and desk under a reasonableness standard);
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (establishing a good faith exception to the fourth amendment warrant requirement); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) (establishing a "public
safety" exception to the fifth amendment .Mlirandawarnings). See contra Bradley, Criminal Procedurein
the Rehnquist Court: Has the Rehnquisition Begun?, 62 IND. L.J. 273 (1987) (maintaining that the decisions of the Rehnquist Court have been moderate, predictable expansions of Warren and Burger
Court precedents). Cf. Maynard v. Cartwright, 108 S.Ct. 1853 (1988) (holding that the aggravating
circumstance of "heinous, atrocious and cruel" in Oklahoma's death penalty statute was unconstitutionally vague).
243 See, Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 257 (1984).
244 Another distinguishing feature of the recent rights reduction decisions is the class implications of these cases. The Supreme Court seems to be creating new classes within the disfavored
criminal defendant category by distinguishing between "good" criminal defendants-those who are
closer to factual innocence-and "bad" criminal defendants-those who are either factually guilty or
legally innocent, when the guilt/innocence distinction is absolutely irrelevant to the issue or right at
hand. This distinction has crept into the areas of habeas review, jury instructions and search and
seizure decisions. See, e.g., Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495 (1986) (emphasis added) (a federal
court may grant habeas relief without a showing of cause for a procedural default "where a constitu-
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sive sections of criminal jurisprudence and insulate these areas from post
conviction challenge.
C.

Constricting Statutory Interpretation

In addition to curtailing constitutional rights and failing to expand
and adapt rights to the demands of new situations, the federal courts are
limiting their caseload by narrowly interpreting statutes that confer positive rights. The scope of employment discrimination, habeas corpus,
civil rights, and other remedial statutes are being pared down by recent
federal decisions. This constricting interpretation takes many forms:
24 6
strict adherence to procedural dictates, 24 5 reduction in suable entities,
2
47
foreclosure of available remedies,
and adoption of interpretations that
will lead to reduced limitation periods, 248 to name but a few.
An increasing chokehold is being applied to the civil rights statutes,
the primary devices for constitutional attack on abusive government action. In addition to increasing the possibilities for wholesale preemption
of the section 1983 cause of action, 2 49 recent Supreme Court decisions
have reduced government entity liability by restrictively interpreting the
contours of supervisor liability250 and by conferring greater immunities. 2 51 In addition, the Court has reduced the ambit of the compensable
constitutional tort.25 2 An undesirable motivating factor behind the contional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent."). See also
O'Neill, The Good, the Bad and the Burger Court: Victims' Rights and a ArewA Model of Ciminal Review, 75J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 363, 383 (1984).

245 See, e.g., Florida v. Long, 108 S. Ct. 2354 (1988) (restrictively interpreting the notice value of
prior precedents to avoid a far reaching imposition of retroactive liability under Title VII).
246 See infra notes 254-260.
247 See supra notes 62-81 and accompanying text.
248 See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 108 S. Ct. 1677 (1988) (holding that the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act's stringent definition of "willfulness" in its liquidated damages
provision must be met under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) for the three year limitations
period for "willful" violations of the FLSA's overtime and record keeping provisions to apply).
249 See supra notes 62-67 and accompanying text.
250 See the progression from City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823-24 (1985) (plaintiff must prove an "affirmative link between the [municipality's] policy and the particular constitutional violation alleged" to establish municipal liability), to Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S.
469 (1985) (plaintiff must sue the municipal policymaker with final responsibility for establishing the
policy in question), to City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 108 S. Ct. 915 (1988) (supervisor who terminated employee did not possess the final policymaking authority), representing the ever expanding
avenues for municipalities to escape liability for § 1983 purposes. Praprotnik confirms the fears that
municipalities would be permitted to engage in an "endless renvoi," Saye v. St. Vrain Valley School
Dist., 650 F. Supp. 716, 719 (D. Colo. 1986), in which one official possesses the titular power to
terminate employees, while another official actually exercises the power, and both successfully deny
liability on the grounds that they lack, "respectively, the responsibility and the authority for the
firing decision." Young v. Sedgwick County, 660 F. Supp. 918, 925 (D. Kan. 1987).
251 The boundaries of good faith immunity were extended to encompass warrantless searches by
law enforcement officials. Anderson v. Creighton, 107 S. Ct. 3034 (1987). Moreover, the test of
official good faith immunity was transformed from a subjective, see Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308,
322 (1975), to an objective one, see Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815-19 (1982), which has
reduced the need for inquiry into the intent of the actor and correlatively has increased the number
of cases which may be disposed of by motion practice.
252 See, e.g., Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986) (the due process clause is not implicated by
negligent acts of state officials which cause loss or injury); Memphis Community School Dist. v.
Stachura, 477 U.S. 299 (1986) (damages based on the abstract value of a constitutional right are not
a permissible element of compensatory relief in § 1983 suits). See generally Mead, Evolution of the
"'Species of Tort Liability" Created by 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Can Constitutional Tort Be Saved From Extinction?
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striction of section 1983 is53 the perceived burden of civil rights suits on
2
the federal court docket.

The Supreme Court has accepted certiorari on two cases that have
the potential to delete vast areas of civil rights litigation. In Will v. Michigan Department of State Police,254 the Court agreed to consider whether a
state and its officers are "persons" subject to suit under section 1983.
The lower court decision in Will determined that states and state officials
sued in their official capacity were not "persons" within the meaning of
the statute. 25 5 Will possesses the potential to cripple section 1983 by
eliminating the major defendant in many civil rights suits.
A second threat on the horizon is Pattersonv. McLean Credit Union,256
in which the Supreme Court announced that it will reconsider its twelveyear old holding in Runyon v. McCrary 25 7 that minorities may sue private
parties for discrimination under section 1981. In 1968 the Supreme
Court determined that section 1982, the companion provision to section
2 58
1981, forbids private discrimination in the rental and sale of property.
In Runyon the Court relied on the firm historical relationship between
section 1981 and 1982, and concluded that it was "now well-established
that... § 1981 prohibits racial discrimination in the making and enforce25 9
ment of private contracts."
There is a tremendous amount at stake in Patterson. Many of the
rights protected by the Runyon interpretation of section 1981 are not
redressable via Title VII. Because of its state action requirement, section
1983 is equally unavailable to remedy private discrimination. If Runyon is
overruled, the Court would be playing fast and loose with stare deci260
sis.
Even if Runyon is not overruled, it is conceivable that Patterson
55 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (1986). See also Whitman, ConstitutionalTorts, 79 MICH. L. REV. 5, 25 (1980)
("the existence of the statutory cause of action means that every expansion of constitutional rights
[through § 1983] will increase the caseload of already overburdened federal courts. This increase
dilutes the ability of federal courts to defend our most significant rights").
253 See Lumbert v. Illinois Dep't of Corrections, 827 F.2d 257, 259 (7th Cir. 1987) (upholding
dismissal of a prisoner's petition for failure to pay partial filing fee of $7.20 and noting that the
plaintiff "ha[d] filed more than thirty lawsuits, all as an inmate, since 1980"). See also Vail v. Board of
Educ., 706 F.2d 1435, 1456 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner,J., dissenting) (dissent from the majority's view
that a terminated athletic director who had a state employment promise was deprived of due process, deploring "the displacement of the whole of state law into the federal courts" and stating "[w]e
are witnessing the trivialization of the Constitution").
254 108 S. Ct. 1466 (1988).
255 Smith v. Department of Pub. Health, 428 Mich. 540, 410 N.W. 2d 749 (1987), cert. granted sub
noa. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 108 S.Ct. 1466 (1988).
256 805 F.2d 1143 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 108 S.Ct. 1419 (1988).
257 427 U.S. 160 (1976). Indeed, the plaintiff petitioned the Court for a writ of certiorari on the
question: "Does 42 U.S.C. § 1981 encompass a claim of racial discriminations ...including a claim
that petitioner was harassed because of her race?" The Court, sua sponte, requested the parties to
brief and argue "[w]hether or not the interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 adopted by this Court in
Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976), should be reconsidered?" Patterson v. McClean, 108 S.Ct.
at 1420 (citations omitted).
258 Jones v. Alfred Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
259 427 U.S. at 168 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
260 Only an institutional compulsion of the highest order could justify the betrayal and disillusionment that reversal would inevitably engender in the victims of racial prejudice. It
would take a special form of hubris for a justice of the Supreme Court to be so certain that
his or her reading of a 120 year old legal fiction was so much better than the contrary
reading of seven conscientious colleagues in 1976; so much better than the consistent reading of the contemporary Congress; and so much better than the passionately held reading
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could become a stare decisis decision which encourages adherence to
past precedent in statutory, but not constitutional, cases. Moreover, the
Court will be depriving minorities of a cause of action essential to unearthing entrenched discrimination.
The Supreme Court also has curtailed federal jurisdiction in the area
of habeas corpus at an increasingly rapid rate. Habeas corpus has long
been the disfavored stepchild of federal review. Federal habeas review
for state petitioners implicates the proper allocation of responsibility between state and federal courts and is perceived as an unwarranted burden on the federal judiciary. 2 6 1 Recent Supreme Court decisions not
only have openly acknowledged the perceived burden of federal habeas
petitions, but gradually have incorporated the notion that habeas is an
encumbrance into the rationales for the theories that restrict the availa2 62
bility of habeas review.
While habeas has long had its detractors, 26 3 the recent reduction of
federal review of habeas petitions is occurring at a dramatic pace. During
the 1970's the Supreme Court issued a series of decisions 264 which held
that a habeas petition could present issues not raised at trial only if the
petitioner established good cause for the procedural default and prejudice from the inability to raise the issues on habeas. The Court also
ruled that fourth amendment claims could not be relitigated in a habeas
petition if there were a full and fair opportunity to present those claims
2 65
in state court.
In the past few years the process of eroding habeas protection has
accelerated. In 1982 the Supreme Court applied the procedural default
rules to federal prisoners petitioning for habeas relief.2 66 The same year,

of at least four current colleagues to justify overruling a generous construction of a legislative ban on the scourge of our racial prejudice.
Neuborne, The Run on Runyon: Will Stare Decisis Become Bankrupt?, 10 Legal Times May 19, 1988, at
16.
261 Meltzer, State Court Fofeitures of FederalRights, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1130 (1986); Pagano, Federal
Habeas Corpusfor State Prisoners: Present and Future, 49 ALB. L. REV. 1 (1984); Remington, State Prisoner
Access to Postconviction Relief-A Lessening Role for Federal Courts; An Increasingly Important Role for State
Courts, 44 OHIo ST. L.J. 287 (1983).
262 See, e.g., Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 539 (1986) ("[P]rofound societal costs that attend the
exercise of habeas jurisdiction" justify the enforcement of procedural default rules).
263 See, e.g., Bator, Finality in CriminalLaw and FederalHabeas Corpusfor State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L.
REV. 441 (1963) (maintaining that trial and sentencing errors can never be completely eradicated
and that attempts to achieve perfect justice through habeas review are cost-ineffective); Friendly, Is
Innocence Irrelevant? CollateralAttachon CriminalJudgments, 38 U. Cm. L. REv. 142 (1970) (arguing that
habeas review should be restricted to cases in which the petitioner makes a showing of factual innocence); Weick, Apportionment of the Judicial Resources in Criminal Cases: Should Habeas Corpus Be Eliminated? 21 DE PAUL L. REv. 740 (1972) (advancing a variety of proposals to limit habeas corpus).
264 See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977); Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976);
Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233 (1973). The Warren Court had refused to use procedural defaults as bars to habeas litigation, see Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 421-22 (1963), out of a distrust for
state procedural protection of criminal defendants. The Burger Court's habeas cases took a very
different view of the need for deference to state proceedings. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S.
at 90.
265 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). See generally Robbins & Sanders, Judicial Integrity, the
Appearance ofJustice and the Great ltit of Habeas Corpus: How to Kill Two Thirds (or More) with One Stone,
15 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 63 (1977).
266 United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152 (1982). The rationale was somewhat altered. No longer
was the concern for comity paramount, see supra text accompanying note 261, but the focus was on

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:321

in Engle v. Isaac,26 7 the Court drastically narrowed the cause and prejudice test for state procedural defaults. In Engle the Court held that even
if a constitutional claim were not something of which counsel should
have been apprised given the current state of the law, "the futility of
presenting an objection to the state courts cannot alone constitute cause
for a failure to object at trial." 268 The Court also narrowed the availability of habeas relief in other ways. In Rose v. Lundy, 26 9 the Court required
the dismissal of any habeas petition containing unexhausted as well as
exhausted claims. 270 And the Court developed a deferential standard of
review for state court findings of fact. 2 7 1 Recent decisions have expanded the category of questions characterized as issues of fact, thus reof issues open for independent redetermination on
ducing the range
2 72
habeas review.
During the 1985-86 term in the companion cases of Murray v. Carrier 273 and Smith v. Murray,274 the Court sharply restricted habeas review

of claims involving procedural defaults. In Carrier,the Court ruled that
attorney inadvertence or ignorance would not suffice for cause, unless it
rose to the level of ineffective assistance. 2 75 While Smith involved a relatively simple application of the test of cause developed in Engle and Carrier,2 7 6 the Court employed language that may foreshadow an additional
hurdle for procedural default claims. The Smith court ruled that the failure to object to trial errors precludes litigation of the error on habeas
emphasizing the finality of criminal judgments and avoiding "a long series of collateral attacks."
Frady, 456 U.S. at 157.
267 456 U.S. 107 (1982). See generally Levit, The Burger Court and Federal Review for State Habeas
Petitioners After Engle v. Isaac, 31 U. KAN. L. REv. 605 (1983).
268 456 U.S. at 130. While the Court acknowledged two years later that a constitutional claim
may be "so novel that its legal basis is not reasonably available to counsel," Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S.
1,16 (1984), this exception to the Engle cause and prejudice formulation is narrow. See Amadeo v.
Zant, 108 S. Ct. 1771 (1988) (holding that a concealed memorandum from the district attorney's
office which was designed to result in the underrepresentation of blacks and women on juries satisfied the cause and prejudice test).
269 455 U.S. 509 (1982).
270 While Rose was an attempt to force a more economical packaging of habeas petitions, the
decision necessarily injects delay into habeas proceedings by requiring exhaustion of unexhausted
claims. Id. at 525-28 (Blackmun,J., concurring) (the majority's decision will actually "increase rather
than alleviate the caseload burdens on both state and federal courts."). Id. at 522.
271 Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591 (1982) (state court factual conclusions must be presumed
correct).
272 See, e.g., Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1036-37 (1984) (determinations regarding "partiality" ofjurors is a question of primary fact which must be afforded a presumption of correctness);
Harris v. Pulley, 852 F.2d 1546, 1557 (9th Cir. 1988) (state trial court's factual findings regarding the
prejudicial effect of pretrial publicity are presumed correct on habeas review); Brooks v. Kincheloe,
848 F.2d 940, 944 (9th Cir. 1988) (merits of dispute concerning witness' status as a government
informant were factual); Flugence v. Butler, 848 F.2d 77, 79 (5th Cir. 1988) (medical inquiry into
defendant's competence is factfinding, which is presumed to be correct); Meeks v. Cabana, 845 F.2d
1319, 1322-23 (5th Cir. 1988) (state court findings as to testimony regarding witness credibility are
entitled to a presumption of correctness); Ballard v. Johnson, 821 F.2d 568, 571 (11 th Cir. 1987)
(presumption of correctness afforded to state court finding that petitioner effectively waived Miranda
protections).
273 477 U.S. 478 (1986).
274 477 U.S. 527 (1986).
275 477 U.S. at 485-88.
276 On appeal, Smith's counsel failed to raise the issue of improper admission of psychiatric testimony. 477 U.S. at 531.
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absent a "substantial claim that the alleged error undermined the accu2 77
racy of the guilt or sentencing determination."
The danger lurking in the articulation of the Smith standard is evidenced by a concurring opinion in a case decided the same day as Smith.
In Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 27 8 the concurrence of four justices concluded that
" the ends of justice' require federal courts to entertain such petitions
only where the prisoner supplements his constitutional claim with a colorable showing of factual innocence." 2 79 Moreover, in Carrier the Court
0
provides an innocence exception for cases of procedural default, 28
which is the first time the innocence inquiry has been injected into a prevailing habeas test. The Carrier-Smith-Kuhlmannrecognition of innocence
as a cognizable habeas issue may evolve into a standard that requires a
procedurally defaulting habeas petitioner to prove factual innocence.
And there is no fundamental philosophical constraint to prevent a factual
innocence standard, once developed, from being universally applied to
habeas petitions, not just to those petitioners committing procedural
defaults.
This capsule of habeas history indicates the increasing rapidity with
which the Court is tossing procedural roadblocks in the path of habeas
petitioners. More importantly though, the collateral review cases in recent terms manifest a different concern and focus than past habeas decisions. 28 ' The Supreme Court repeatedly justifies its habeas rulings by
emphasizing the problem of the federal caseload. 282 The fundamental
purpose of habeas review is to preclude the detention of persons held "in
custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States." 28 3 Instead of concentrating on analyzing constitutional issues
277 Id. at 539.
278 477 U.S. 436 (1986).
279 Id. at 454 (emphasis added).
280 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986) ("[I]n an extraordinary case, where a constitutional violation has
probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent, a federal habeas court may grant
the writ even in the absence of a showing of cause for the procedural default.").
281 The underlying presumption of habeas is that the fundamental right to liberty protected by
the habeas process warrants the fail-safe mechanism of a federal court reevaluating the merits of
federal constitutional claims. See generally Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953). However, Justice
Jackson's concurrence in Brown has proven prophetic: "It must prejudice the occasional meritorious
application to be buried in a flood of worthless ones. He who must search a haystack for a needle is
likely to end up with the attitude that the needle is not worth the search." Id. at 537 (Jackson, J.,
concurring). See also Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 547 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (The sheer
volume of habeas cases "has led this Court into the business of creating special procedural rules for
dealing with this flood of litigation.").
Two pending cases offer the Court the opportunity to directly limit the number of successive
habeas petitions. In Dugger v. Adams, 816 F.2d 1493 (11 th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1106
(1988), and Zant v. Moore, 824 F.2d 847 (11 th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1467 (1988), the
government is claiming an "abuse" of the writ stemming from its repeated use.
282 See, e.g., Carrier,477 U.S. at 487-88 (observing that federal district courts do not have the time
to hold evidentiary hearings to ascertain the real cause of procedural defaults). In actuality, the
number of habeas petitions as a portion of the federal courts' dockets has remained constant, while
the number of prisoners has more than doubled. "So we have two-and-one-half times the number of
prisoners, filing approximately the same number of petitions." Robbins, Whither (or Wither) Habeas
Corpus? Observations on the Supreme Court's 1985 Term, I ll F.R.D. 265, 267 (1986).
283 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1982). See also Peller, In Defense of Federal Habeas Corpus Relitigation, 16
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 579, 690-91 (1982), in which Professor Peller convincingly argues that statutory history, language, and the demands of justice require federal habeas review for all constitutional claims.
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affecting life and liberty, the Supreme Court illegitimately has become
concerned with the institutional structuring of the habeas review process.
IV. Deceptive Appearances Decisions
The jurisdiction tinkering theory discussed above is not all encompassing. No single theory, however unifying, can explain the entirety of
decisions emanating from the Supreme Court or lower federal courts.
However, many more cases fit the pattern than might first appear. Indeed, a number of decisions which at first glance might appear to beckon
disadvantaged plaintiffs into federal court are, in actuality, illusory. Not
only are some of these seemingly liberal decisions not welcoming, not
jurisdiction expanding, and not rights creating, they are actually hostile
to the underprivileged and powerless, and contain within them the seeds
284
of future destructive jurisprudence.
2 85
Several examples will illustrate the point. In Satterwhite v. Texas,
the defendant was charged with the capital crime of murder during the
commission of a robbery. The district attorney requested a psychiatric
evaluation of Satterwhite's competency to stand trial. Defense counsel
was not served with a copy of the motion requesting evaluation. During
his sentencing proceeding, the State introduced the testimony of the examining psychiatrist that Satterwhite presented a threat to society. A majority of the Court concluded that the use of the psychiatric testimony at
the capital sentencing proceeding violated the sixth amendment because
2 86
of the lack of notice to counsel.
The majority then questioned whether the sixth amendment violation could be considered harmless error. 2 87 Although the majority concluded that the admission of the psychiatric testimony under the
circumstances of Satterwhite's case was not harmless, the dissent focused
succinctly on the true danger of the Satterwhite ruling: "Until today's ruling, this Court never had applied harmless-error analysis to constitu2 88
tional violations that taint the sentencing phase of a capital trial."
With its sixth amendment violation holding, Satterwhite appears to
arrive at a result favorable to a capital defendant. In actuality, Satterwhite
is an insidiously dangerous decision for all defendants who have errors
that affect the sentencing phase of their capital trials. By importing a
harmless error standard into the sentencing phase of capital trials, the
284 If this pattern ofjudicial decision making were viewed in political theory terms, it might appear to resemble Herbert Marcuse's notion of repressive tolerance. See Marcuse, Repressive Tolerance,
in R. WOLFF, B. MOORE & H. MARCUSE, A CRITIQUE OF PURE TOLERANCE 81 (1965) ("What is pro-

claimed and practiced as tolerance today is in many of its most effective manifestations serving the
cause of oppression."). Actually, the vast expansions of individual rights brought about during the
Warren Court years are more repressively tolerant, in the true sense of the theory, than the decisions
of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts, which are simply repressive, and not tolerant.
285 108 S. Ct. 1792 (1988).
286 Id. at 1797.
287 Id. at 1797-99. While the Court recognized that sixth amendment violations that pervade an
entire proceeding cannot be harmless error, id. (citing Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978)), it
pointed to various errors in noncapital cases and an error in a capital case, Gilbert v. California, 388
U.S. 263 (1967) (admission of lineup identification testimony obtained in violation of right to counsel), that have been judged by the harmless error standard.
288 Id. at 1800 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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Supreme Court has created a vehicle to effectively shut down a wide
range of constitutional challenges to capital sentencing proceedings. 28 9
A similar sleight of hand was practiced in the crafting of Thompson v.
Oklahoma.290 In Thompson the Court considered whether a defendant
could be executed for a murder in which he participated at the age of 15.
Justice Stevens, writing for himself and Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
Blackmun, concluded that execution of persons under 16 violated the
eighth amendment's "'evolving standards of decency.' "291 In a concurrence, Justice O'Connor provided the essential fifth vote to reverse the
death sentence. However, the basis forJustice O'Connor's decision was
that the Oklahoma Legislature did not explicitly permit capital punishment for persons under the age of 16.292
While Justice O'Connor acknowledged that a large majority of state
legislatures have outlawed the death penalty for 15-year-olds and that
"strong counterevidence would be required to persuade" her that a national consensus does not exist, 2 93 Justice O'Connor leaves room for future state legislatures

to set a statutory minimum age. 2 94

More

importantly, she delineates precisely the sort of statistical and legislative
history evidence that would compel her to join the four dissenting justices and uphold a state statute imposing the death penalty on
juveniles. 29 5 Indeed, in the absence of proof of societal consensus, proof
which she recognizes is unavailable,2 9 6 Justice O'Connor appears to defer to state legislatures that clearly indicate a desire to permit juveniles to
29 7
be death-eligible.
Death penalty opponents are running out of arguments. Following
the Furman-Gregg298 restructuring of capital statutes, capital defendants
299
advanced several new waves of innovative constitutional challenges.
The latest spate of Supreme Court decisions, including Thompson, Satter289 In arriving at this decision, the Court may be creating far more work for itself and the federal
district and appellate courts, because harmless error analysis necessitates factual inquiry. This indicates that when the goals of caseload reduction and merits adjudication against disfavored groups
compete, the Court may be more concerned with the results than the process.
290 108 S. Ct. 2687 (1988).
291 Id. at 2691 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958)).
292 Id. at 2711 (O'ConnorJ., concurring).
293 Id. at 2706-07.
294 Id. at 2711 ("[The approach I take allows the ultimate moral issue at stake in the constitutional question to be addressed in the first instance by those best suited to do so, the people's
elected representatives.").
295 Id. at 2708-11.
296 Id. at 2706-07.
297 Thus, the ruling in Thompson should not be greeted as a victory for death penalty abolitionists.
Not only does Thompson leave explicitly unresolved the larger question of whether the imposition of
the death penalty on juveniles comports with current eighth amendment jurisprudence, Justice
O'Connor's concurrence, with its brief writing and legislation drafting guidance, steers capital litigation down a path that could easily arrive at a 5-4 decision upholding state legislation, as long as that
indicates a clear intent to permit the application of the death penalty to juveniles.
298 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
299 See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987), discussedsupra notes 206-21 and accompanying text; Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986) (rejecting the contention that death-qualified
juries are more conviction prone); Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984) (state proportionality review
is not required by the eighth amendment).
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white, and Tison v. Arizona,300 is narrowing the range of litigable issues in
capital cases. Even decisions such as Thompson, which at first blush appear to provide a greater quantum of rights to capital defendants, are
actually rights constricting. Consequently, the death penalty is becoming
a more easily attainable method of punishment, and constitutional challenges in capital cases are increasingly easy to dispatch. The hoped-for
30
effect is fewer capital cases in the federal court system. '
The pattern of promising but dangerous decisions is playing out in
noncapital cases as well. For example, in Webster v. Doe,30 2 a discharged
employee sued the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, claiming
he was dismissed because of his homosexuality. The Supreme Court's
specific holding that judicial review of constitutional claims is not precluded by section 701(a)(2) of the Administrative Procedures Act
(APA)3 0 3 is far overshadowed by the broad ruling that congressional intent precludes judicial review of individual employment decisions under
the APA. 30 4 Moreover, the reviewability of the constitutional claims exception is illusory, at least in Doe's case. Since Bowers v. Hardwick3 0 5
makes clear that homosexual conduct is punishable under criminal laws,
it is extraordinarily doubtful that Doe's status as a homosexual would
provide the basis for a constitutional claim.
The difficulty with decisions that appear to open the courthouse
doors is that litigants may be misguided. While Satterwhite, for example,
seems to invite challenges to the types of evidence introduced in the sentencing phase of a capital trial, it portends the expansion of the harmless
error standard into a wide range of outcome-determinative evidentiary
issues. The deceptive appearances decisions are perhaps more dangerous for their appearances than for their individual deceptions, since they
invite greater use of access and rights constricting theories.
V. The Substantive Effects ofJurisdictional Manipulation
The link between the caseload burden felt by federal judges and
their views on substantive constitutional rights and jurisdictional theories
is becoming apparent. Some of the caseload-concern decisions involve
purely procedural adjustments made solely to lessen the input ofjudicial
resources,3 0 6 adjustments which do not tinker with jurisdictional doctrines and in no way affect substantive rights. These decisions are either
benign or helpful and they are not subject to the same critiques as juris300 481 U.S. 137 (1987) (holding that a state statute permitting imposition of the death penalty
on a person who did not kill, attempt to kill or intend a killing is constitutional).
301 The Court has moved from handling broad systemic challenges to capital punishment statutes
to a more narrow error-based pattern of review. There are even indications the Court is tiring of its
appellate review function. See, e.g., Franklin v. Lynaugh, 108 S. Ct. 2320, 2330 (1988) (A four-justice
plurality rejected petitioner's argument that the jury instructions failed to permit the jury to consider
the full range of mitigating circumstances and held that the state's treatment of mitigating evidence
had been upheld in 1976 and should not be examined further by the Court.).
302 108 S. Ct. 2047 (1988).
303 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
304 108 S. Ct. at 2053.
305 478 U.S. 186 (1986), discussed supra notes 186-93 and accompanying text.
306 See supra note 34 for a mention of the ameliorative impact of Dunton v. County of Suffolk,
748 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1984).
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diction altering decisions. However, when docket concerns have an impact on the formation of jurisdictional doctrines, this creeping
pragmatism has a number of institutional and substantive effects.
A.

The Menace of the "Least Dangerous Branch"

30 7
Most importantly, the judiciary is treading in legislative territory.
The case overload problem is seemingly structural-too many cases and
too few courts, judgeships or resources to process them. If the problem
is one of architecture, institutional reforms should be the province of the
legislature. Federal courts which import caseload analysis into their jurisdictional theories to effect structural changes are engaging in the systematic displacement of the legislative prerogative. 30 8 Separation of
powers was intended as an institutional constraint to prevent judicial
domination. Individual judges are basing institutional decisions on their
own views of the respective roles of federal and state courts and of legislative intent. Not surprisingly, this leads to unpredictable and inconsistent usage of legislative intent.
The institutional facet of the problem has additional ramifications.
By historical example,3 0 9 the deference to state courts will lead to a decrease in the uniformity of decisions. Indeed, substantive constitutional
rights may vary directly with geography. Additionally, the question of
institutional competence surfaces. The overall quality of state, as opposed to federal, decisions has long been a matter of debate. 3 10 Numerous commentators argue persuasively that federal judges possess the

307 See generally M. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL
POWER 7-34 (1980) (discussing congressional and judicial authority to control the jurisdiction of
article III courts).
308 Indeed, Professor Martin Redish argues that judge-made abstention creates a "considerably
greater risk ofjudicial usurpation" than active judicial lawmaking because there is little the legislature can do to combat inactivity. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial
Function, 94 YALE LJ.71, 114 (1984).
309 Following Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), which left open the possibility of state regulation of abortion in the last two trimesters of pregnancy, courts have handled a spate of varying state
statutes concerning notice, funding, information and other procedures. See, e.g., Thornburgh v.
American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (striking down a Pennsylvania statute requiring doctors to report the names of women seeking abortion to the state and
requiring women desiring abortions to be exposed to medically unnecessary information); City of
Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (holding unconstitutional a
municipal ordinance requiring parental consent for minors obtaining abortions and imposing a 24
hour waiting period); H. L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981) (upholding a Utah statute requiring
physicians to notify the parents or guardians of unemancipated minors before performing an abortion). Compare Hodgson v. Minnesota, 853 F.2d 1452 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding unconstitutional a
parental notification provision which failed to provide a judicial bypass alternative, but upholding a
48 hour waiting period) with Akron Center for Reproductive Health v. Slaby, 854 F.2d 852 (6th Cir.
1988) (striking down a judicial bypass procedure that entailed particular pleading and notice requirements that could span up to 22 days). See also Hallmark Clinic v. North Carolina Dep't of
Human Resources, 380 F. Supp. 1153, 1157-58 (E.D.N.C. 1974) (discussing the state's regulation of
abortion procedures, the court noted: "That the state is ordinarily willing to leave such matters to
the professional judgment of the attending physician strongly suggests that the program for regulating abortion clinics is a thinly disguised effort to evade Roe and Doe.").
310 See Neuborne, supra note 106, at 1118-30.
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institutional independence, as well as the familiarity and expertise, to
more effectively vindicate unpopular federal rights. 3 11
Even if the historical presumption that federal courts are less biased
or more skilled does not hold true-particularly given the current federal
appointments-the point is that litigants are being denied constitutionally 31 2 and congressionally 31 3 mandated access to a federal forum. Federal courts have a constitutional
obligation to exercise jurisdiction, rather
3 14
than chip away at it.
For those cases that are not shuttled back to state courts, the selective
consideration of overload interferes with principled decision-making.
This will lead to a similar sort of entropy on the federal level: blurring
the boundaries of already imprecise jurisdictional doctrines. Moreover,
the combination of selective activism 3 15 and restraint 31 6 looks increasingly less like judging and more like politics. 3 17 Political predilections of
individual judges are determing the scope of article III jurisdiction.
Since the current political leaning of a majority of federal court judges is
conservative, doctrines ofjudicial restraint are becoming mere conduits
for the implementation of conservative value adjudication.
B.

DeconstructingAdministrability

Even if administrative efficiency was not being used as an excuse for
targeted constitutional adjustments, administrability itself may be a ruse.
The liberal-conservative battle regarding court access has played out
over the years with liberals maintaining that current doctrines of justiciability and jurisdiction hurt underprivileged and marginal groups.
Conservatives responded that this position was value-laden, and therefore not good legal argument. Conservatives, and now many law and
economics adherents, called for neutral principles of adjudication, 3 18 one
of which is the efficient administration of the federal caseload.
311 See Weinberg, supra note 115, at 1241 ("The presumption that state courts will vindicate every
constitutional right breaks down, and has always broken down, when the question is the race question. That is why Congress struck the balance in favor of providing the option of a federal forum in
section 1983."); Redish & Muench, Adjudication of FederalCauses of Action in State Court, 75 MICH. L.
REV. 311, 330 (1976) (federal judges possess greater technical competence to interpret federal statutes than state judges). But see Bator, CongressionalPower Over the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 27
VILL. L. REV. 1030, 1070 (1982) (maintaining that there is an absence of evidence that state judges
are insensitive to federal constitutional claims). See generally Solimine & Walker, ConstitutionalLitigation in Federal and State Courts: An EmpiricalAnalysis ofJudicial Parity, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 213
(1983).
312 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
313 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982).
314 Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 375 (1821). See also Clinton,A .Mandatory iew of
FederalCourt Jurisdiction: A Guided Quest for the Original Understandingof Article III, 132 U. PA. L. REV.
741 (1984).
315 The reluctance to adhere to precedent is evident in the Patterson call for a reconsideration of
the decade old Runyon decision. See supra notes 256-60 and accompanying text.
316 See supra notes 175-221 and accompanying text.
317 See, e.g., Bork, Neutral Principlesand Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 6 (1971) ("[A]
Court that makes rather than implements value choices cannot be squared with the presuppositions
of a democratic society.").
318 See generally Wechsler. Toward Neutral Principlesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 10-20
(1959) (adjudication must be made on the basis of neutral principles that transcend immediately
desired results); Bork, Neutral Principlesand Some FirstAmendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 7-19 (1971)
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However, this "neutral" concept of administrability is loaded with a
series of assumptions that are pro-elitist and anti-civil rights. A primary
ideological assumption of administrative efficiency is that the court system should handle only a few good cases.3 l 9 This notion disenfranchises
not just a large number of litigants, but large numbers of certain classes
of litigants.
Access to federal courts is being limited at a far more rapid pace for
certain types of plaintiffs and defendants.3 20 However, the latest round
of jurisdictional triage targets more than the usual suspects: civil rights
litigants, habeas petitioners and public interest litigants. More broadly,
the curtailment of federal jurisdiction works against the disadvantaged
and powerless classes, 3 2 1 those who cannot afford a better attorney, 32 2
the have-nots as opposed to the haves.3 2 3 The impact of recent jurisdictional and substantive narrowing certainly falls more heavily on civil
rights and habeas litigants. However, the recent jurisdictional theories
are more fundamentally inhospitable to the economically weaker side in
almost any federal court suit. Even the "purely procedural" remodeling
3 24
contains less-than-subtle repressive biases.
The second underlying assumption of administrative efficiency is
that administrability should be a paramount value; that it is a value which
is on par with or surpasses3 2 5 the worth of any substantive right, the
meaning of which can only come through interpretation. Because of this
unexplicit and predetermined weighting process, the jurisdiction-tinkering decisions are failures in judicial craft and analysis. Even if separation
of powers were not a concern, courts are engaging in what should be
complicated cost-benefit analysis, weighing overload as an institutional
cost. However, many courts are oversimplifying the calculus by failing to
engage in a rights-balancing process: the courts consider only one half
of the equation. Overload has become the determinative issue, rather
than one of a number of factors. Indeed, it is highly questionable that
the sheer number of cases in federal court should even be a consideration in determining constitutional issues.
Finally, and perhaps most dangerous of all is the notion that administrability is apolitical. Indeed, the hidden aspects of administrative
efficiency are unexpressed and reformulated class choices. This seem(supporting neutral principles concept). But see Miller & Howell, The Myth of Neutrality in ConstitutionalAdjudication, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 661, 664 (1960) ("Adherence to neutral principles, in the sense
of principles which do not refer to value choices, is impossible in the constitutional adjudicative
process.").
319 See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text. This could be seen as a Posnerian analog to the
Marine recruit theme of desiring "a few good men."
320 In 1977, Professor Louise Weinberg documented the federal court barriers that were being
created to disadvantage public interest litigants. Weinberg, supra note 115, at 1192. See also Weinberg, The New Judicial Federalism: Where Are We Now, 19 GA. L. REV. 1075 (1985).
321 See supra notes 73-80 and accompanying text.
322 The sophistication and technical expertise in matters of federal jurisdiction demanded by the
recent onslaught ofjurisdiction-narrowing decisions may be available only at a large law firm, which
has the personnel, resources and time to devote to the crafting of complicated arguments.
323 See supra note 59.
324 See supra notes 36-61 and accompanying text.
325 Perhaps because of its "neutral" content?
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ingly neutral value of efficiency, which is being used to justify institutional changes, is not without its class and political implications. This is
not to say that politics has no place in judging, just that political assumptions must be made express and the premises upon which "neutral" principles of adjudication rest must be examined.
C. A Ratchet Theory ofJurisdiction
Political monasticism probably is not attainable for the judiciary. It
is not even desirable. The notion that there can or should be pure merits
adjudication is false to the basic structure of civil rights litigation, which
is a process that seeks structural, procedural and, on occasion, political
reforms as well as fact adjudication. However, the use of an overabundance of cases as a doctrinal justification for closure of court access runs
afoul of constitutional commands. Even though there may be an increase
in the volume of federal litigation, the use of caseload concerns to restrictively alter jurisdictional theories is illegitimate because of the purposes of article III.
The alteration ofjurisdictional theories based on the caseload crisis
is an unwarranted use of substantive law to serve procedure. Procedure
should serve substance in constitutional litigation. When in doubt,
judges should adopt rules that make it easier for litigants attempting to
32 6
vindicate constitutional rights to be in federal court.
It may seem inequitable and downright unsportsmanlike to posit
that civil rights and public interest law litigants may call for systemic reforms that widen court access while law and economics adherents are not
permitted to request structural changes to reduce access to the federal
courts. However, this "ratchet" theory ofjurisdiction 32 7 finds support in
several Supreme Court decisions 328 and in the structure of the federal
3 29
system.
The judicial parallel to the congressional one-way revolving door for
constitutional rights was noted by Justice Stevens: "the primary role of
this Court is to make sure that persons who seek to vindicate federal rights
have been fairly heard. ' 33 0 Applying the ratchet theory of rights tojurisdictional analysis makes sense, at least within the caseload context. A
326 This view is diametrically opposed to the proposals addressed by Judge Posner, see supra note
18, which operate to shift the presumption so as to disfavor federal vindication of constitutional
claims.
327 The "ratchet" phrase apparently was first employed by Professor Cohen in his argument that
congressional power to alter constitutional rights operates only in one direction: to expand, but not
contract constitutional protections. Cohen, CongressionalPower to Interpret Due Process and Equal Proteclion, 27 STAN. L. REV. 603, 606 (1975).
328 See, e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 n.10 (1966) (Congress can enact laws that
enforce or strengthen the guarantees of due process and equal protection under the fourteenth
amendment, but "Congress [has] no power to restrict, abrogate, or dilute these guarantees."); Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 732-33 (1982) (Congress cannot "validate a law
that denies the rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.").
329 Brennan, The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification, 19 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 26
(1985) ("[iut is the very purpose of a constitution.., to declare certain values transcendent, beyond
the reach of contemporary political majorities."). Similarly, while state courts may not limit rights
beneath constitutional minima, they may extend those rights more expansively than the Constitution
requires.
330 Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1068 (1983) (Stevens,J, dissenting) (emphasis in original).
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purpose of article III jurisdiction is to vindicate federally created
rights. 33 ' The need for access to a federal forum is particularly acute
when there is a possibility that federal rights will not be protected otherwise. 33 2 The remedial responsibility of federal courts should prevent the
jurisdictional door from revolving backward if the only impetus for the
reversal is a case-processing concern. Without a similar theory of jurisdiction, the ratchet theory of rights is meaningless, because rights will
simply be denied at the earlier, jurisdictional stage.
VI.

Conclusion

In one sense, the entire overload controversy does devolve to a battle of systemic political visions. If one believes that the system of laws is
fair to underprivileged and marginal groups, then federal court access is
not viewed as a constitutional necessity, and the federal caseload may be
pared down for efficiency reasons. On the other hand, those who think
that laws do not adequately protect underprivileged and marginal
groups, and that there are too many social, class and institutional misfeasances, believe it is the special role of the federal courts to protect people
from systemic malfunctions. The different visions lead to different views
of the proper procedural role of the federal courts. This brings the
caseload riddle full circle: perhaps a formidable amount of federal litigation is a good thing,3 3 3 particularly if insensitivities to constitutional
rights are not being remedied by other social institutions.
It may be argued that the shunting of cases from federal to state
courts and the paring down of federal remedies is simply a trend toward
more efficient packaging of disputes. This efficiency or administrability
argument is at the heart of the caseload versus rights controversy. As the
substantive rights cases3 3 4 make clear, the names of federalism and efficiency are being invoked as reasons for the federal courts to shirk their
duties to protect against serious threats to constitutional freedom.
More fundamentally, an unacknowledged and elitist premise has
seeped into many federal decisions: that the role of the federal judiciary
is to handle only a few deserving cases. As the Honorable Jonathan
Varat suggested, "we might well think that the quality ofjustice would be
better served, however, if federal courts did more slightly less well than
too little extremely well." 3 3 5 If jurisdictional theories reflect considerations not of justice to the individual litigant, but of how much justice
331 See, e.g., Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 239-42 (1971).
332 It may be argued that currently the federal courts are stocked with conservative judges and
state court judges are left to implement more liberal visions of the Constitution. See, e.g., Note,
Miranda and the State Constitution: State Courts Take a Stand, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1693 (1986); Newman,
The "'Old Federalism"" Protectionof Individual Rights by State Constitutions in an Era of FederalCourt Passivity, 15 CONN. L. REV. 21 (1982). However, the offices will outlast the views of those who occupy
them, see Balkin, Federalism and the Conservative Ideology, 19 URB. LAW. 459 (1987), while the nature of
the federally created rights sought to be vindicated should remain if not a relative constant at least
an evolving but irreducible quantum.
333 See supra note 1.
334 See supra notes 175-244 and accompanying text.
335 Varat, Economic Ideology and the FederalJudicialTask, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 649, 655 (1986).
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society can pragmatically tolerate, this social judgment demands a more
honest evaluation.

